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ABSTRACT
Financial innovation and overconfidence about asset values and the riskiness of new financial products
were important factors behind the U.S. credit crisis. We show that a boom-bust cycle in debt, asset
prices and consumption characterizes the equilibrium dynamics of a model with a collateral constraint
in which agents learn \by observation" the true riskiness of a new financial environment. Early realizations
of states with high ability to leverage assets into debt turn agents overly optimistic about the persistence
probability of a high-leverage regime. Conversely, the first realization of a low-leverage state turns
agents unduly pessimistic about future credit prospects. These effects interact with the Fisherian deflation
mechanism, resulting in changes in debt, leverage, and asset prices larger than predicted under either
rational expectations without learning or with learning but without Fisherian deflation. The model
predicts a large, sustained increase in net household debt and in residential land prices between 1997
and 2006, followed by a sharp collapse in 2007.
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mendozae@econ.umd.edu\Booms become busts because justi¯able con¯dence becomes foolish optimism." {Robert
J. Samuelson, "Causes of the Crisis," Washington Post, 3/19/2012.
1 Introduction
The U.S. ¯nancial crisis was preceded by sharp increases in household credit, residential land prices,
and leverage ratios (see Figure 1).1 Between 1996 and 2006, the year in which the crisis started as
home prices began to decline nationwide, the net credit assets of U.S. households fell from -35 to
-70 percent of GDP. By contrast, this ratio was very stable in the previous two decades. During
1996-2006, the market value of residential land as a share of GDP also surged, from 45 to nearly
75 percent.2 Debt grew much faster than land values, however, because the ratio of the two, a
macroeconomic measure of household leverage, rose from 0.64 in 1996 to 0.93 in 2006. The crisis
then resulted in a sudden increase in leverage, as land prices fell faster than the ability to reduce
debts, and leverage continued hovering around 1.2 after that.
As the timeline in Figure 2 shows, the U.S. credit boom started with a period of signi¯cant
¯nancial innovation characterized by two central features: First, the introduction of new ¯nancial
instruments that \securitized" the payment streams generated by a wide variety of assets, particu-
larly home mortgages. Second, far-reaching reforms that radically changed the legal and regulatory
framework of ¯nancial markets.
The gradual introduction of collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) dates back to the early 1980s,
but the securitization boom that fueled the growth of household debt started in the mid 1990s with
the introduction of collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs). This process was greatly ampli¯ed
by the introduction of credit default swaps (CDSs) on the payments of CMOs by the mid 2000s.
In addition, synthetic securitization allowed third parties to trade bets on the income streams of
the new instruments. By the end of 2007, the market of CDSs alone was worth about $45 trillion
(or 3 times U.S. GDP).
The ¯nancial reforms introduced in the 1990s were the most signi¯cant since the Great Depres-
sion, and in fact aimed at removing the barriers separating bank and non-bank ¯nancial intermedi-
1High leverage in ¯nancial institutions also played a critical role. Still, understanding the mechanisms that drove
the household credit boom is very important, because housing-related securities were the main component of the surge
in leverage of ¯nancial institutions, and these securities were anchored on mortgage origination at the household level.
2 Following Davis and Heathcote (2007), we focus on residential land prices instead of housing prices. They showed
that land prices are more important than prices of residential dwellings for understanding the evolution of housing
prices. They decomposed U.S. housing prices into the prices of land and structures, and found that between 1975
and 2006 residential land prices quadrupled while prices of physical structures increased only by 1/3rd in real terms.
Furthermore, land prices are about three times more volatile than prices of structures.
1Figure 1: Net Credit Market Assets, Value of Residential Land and Leverage Ratio
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Notes: This ¯gure plots the net credit market assets to GDP ratio for the U.S. households and non-pro¯t organiza-
tions. Sources: Net Credit Market Assets: Flow of Funds Accounts of the U.S. provided by the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System. Value of Residential Land: Davis and Heathcote (2007).
aries set in 1933 with the Glass-Steagall Banking Act. Three Acts were particularly important for
the housing and credit booms: The 1995 New Community Reinvestment Act, which strengthened
the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in mortgage markets and facilitated mortgage securitiza-
tion; the 1999 Gramm{Leach{Bliley Act, which removed the prohibition on bank holding compa-
nies from owning other ¯nancial companies; and the 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act,
which stipulated that over-the-counter derivatives such as CDSs would not be regulated as futures
contracts, securities, or lotteries under federal law.
2Figure 2: Timeline of Events During the Run-up to the U.S. Credit Crisis
1987 Issuance of the ¯rst CDO ²
² 1995 New Community Reinvestment Act 1995 Net credit assets-GDP starts falling ²
² 1997 Issuance of the ¯rst CDS at JPMorgan
1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ² ² 2000 Commodity Futures Modernization Act
2006 Peak of stock and housing markets ²
² 2008 Net credit assets-GDP bottoms
2010 Dodd-Frank Wall St. Reform Act ²
The pattern connecting ¯nancial innovation, booms in credit and asset prices, and ¯nancial
crises is not a phenomenon unique to the recent U.S. experience. In fact, credit booms and busts
are commonly associated with large changes in the ¯nancial environment. It is well-known, for
instance, that many of the countries to which the ¯nancial crisis spread after hitting the United
States displayed similar pre-crisis features, in terms of a large expansion of the ¯nancial sector
into new instruments under new regulations, and also experienced housing booms (e.g. the United
Kingdom, Spain, Iceland, Ireland). The experiences of Eastern European transition economies in
the aftermath of ¯nancial liberalization, and of the Baltic states in the mid 2000's, just before
entering the European Union, are also good examples, and there is evidence of a similar process at
work before the Great Depression in the form of a securitization boom in commercial mortgages
(Goetzmann and Newman (2010)). Mendoza and Terrones (2012) provide more systematic evidence
of this phenomenon. They found that 35 percent of the credit booms observed in the 1960-2010
period across developed and emerging economies occurred after surges in capital °ows, which were
largely driven by reforms that liberalized capital accounts, and 25 percent occurred after large
¯nancial reforms. They also found that credit booms are associated with sharp cycles in economic
activity and housing prices.
This paper provides an explanation for the observed relationship between ¯nancial innovation
and the credit cycle. In particular, we show that ¯nancial innovation, interacting with credit
constraints, can lead to a \natural" underpricing of the risk associated with a new ¯nancial en-
vironment, and that this can produce a surge in credit and asset prices, followed by a collapse.
Undervaluing the risk is natural because of the lack of data on the default and performance records
of the new ¯nancial instruments, and on the stability of the ¯nancial system under new laws. In
3line with this argument, the strategy of \layering of risk" in the U.S. securitization boom justi¯ed
the belief that the new instruments were so well diversi¯ed that they were virtually risk free. The
latter was presumably being attained by using portfolio models that combined top-rated tranches of
assets with tranches containing riskier assets{under the assumption that the risk of the assets was
priced correctly. As Drew (2008) described it: \The computer modelers gushed about the tranches.
The layers spread out the risk. Only a catastrophic failure would bring the structure crashing down,
and the models said that wouldn't happen."
We propose a model in which the true riskiness of the new ¯nancial environment can only be
discovered with time, and this learning process interacts with a collateral constraint that limits
households' debt not to exceed a fraction of the market value of their holdings of a ¯xed asset
(i.e., land). Financial innovation is modeled as a structural change that introduces a regime with a
higher leverage limit. Agents know that in this new environment one of two ¯nancial regimes can
materialize in any given period: one in which high ability to leverage continues, and one in which
there is a lower leverage limit. They do not know the true riskiness of the new ¯nancial environment,
because they lack data with which to estimate accurately the true switching probabilities across
these two regimes. They are Bayesian learners, however, and so they learn over time as they
observe regime realizations, and in the long-run their beliefs converge to the true regime-switching
probabilities. Hence, in the long-run the model converges to the rational expectations (RE) solution,
with the risk of the ¯nancial environment priced correctly.3 In the short-run, however, optimal
plans and asset prices deviate from the RE equilibrium, because beliefs di®er from those of the RE
solution, and this leads to a mispricing of risk.
The collateral constraint introduces into the model the well-known Fisherian debt-de°ation
mechanism of ¯nancial ampli¯cation, but the analysis of the interaction of this mechanism with
the learning dynamics is a novel feature of this paper.4 In particular, the deviations of the agents'
beliefs from the true RE regime-switching probabilities distort asset pricing conditions. If the
constraint binds, optimistic beliefs lead agents to assign higher probabilities to states with lower
excess returns, which causes a feedback loop producing higher asset prices and higher debt, and the
3We follow the standard treatment in the imperfect information literature to refer to the perfect information
equilibrium as the rational expectations equilibrium, even though the Bayesian learning equilibrium is also a rational
expectations equilibrium.
4The debt-de°ation framework as originally envisaged by Fisher (1933) gave a prominent role to changes in
optimism and gloom of economic agents, but modern formulations of ¯nancial accelerators abstract from °uctuations
in beliefs. It is also interesting to note that Fisher assigned a limited role to changes in beliefs except when they
interact with the debt-de°ation mechanism: \I fancy that over-con¯dence seldom does any great harm except when,
as, and if, it beguiles its victims into debt." ( Fisher (1933)).
4Figure 3: Banks' Willingness To Lend














































Tightening Standards for Mortgage Loans
Increased Willingness to Make Consumer Installment Loans
Tightening Standards on Credit Card Loans
Notes: This ¯gure plots the net percentage of domestic banks that reported tightening standards for mortgage loans
and credit card loans; and increased willingness to make consumer installment loans. The banks can choose from
¯ve answers, 1) tightened signi¯cantly, 2) tightened somewhat, 3) remained unchanged, 4) eased somewhat, 5) eased
signi¯cantly. Net percentages are calculated by subtracting the number of banks that chose 4 or 5 from those that
chose 1 or 2, and then dividing by the total number of respondents. Source: Willingness to Lend Survey of the U.S.,
provided by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
opposite occurs when agents are pessimistic. Thus, the over- or under-pricing of assets translates
into over- or under-in°ated collateral values that a®ect the debt-de°ation dynamics.
Quantitative analysis shows that the process of discovery of risk in the presence of collateral
constraints has important macroeconomic e®ects, and leads to a period of booming credit and land
prices, followed by a sharp, sudden collapse. We conduct an experiment calibrated to U.S. data in
which we date the start of ¯nancial innovation in the ¯rst quarter of 1997 and the beginning of the
¯nancial crisis in the ¯rst quarter of 2007. Hence, from 1997 to the end of 2006 we assume that
the economy experienced the high-leverage regime, followed by a switch to the low-leverage regime
in the ¯rst quarter of 2007.5 The stock of net credit assets did not rise sharply then (see Figure
1), but the fraction of banks that tightened credit standards jumped from nearly zero to over 50
percent (see Figure 3), and the median downpayment on conventional mortgages jumped from 5
to 13 percent (see Feb. 16, Wall Street Journal).
The initial priors of the Bayesian learning process are calibrated to match observed excess
returns on Fannie Mae residential MBS at the beginning of 1997, and the high- and low-leverage
5We take this switch to the low-leverage as exogenous. One way to endogenously generate such a switch is to
explicitly model the freeze of the interbank market as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).
5limits are set equal to the observed leverage ratios before 1997 and at the end of 2006. Under
these assumptions, our model predicts that agents become optimistic about the probability of
persistence of the high-leverage regime very soon after 1997, and remain so until they observe
the switch to the low-leverage regime. During this \optimistic phase," debt, leverage and land
prices rise signi¯cantly above what the RE equilibrium predicts.6 In fact, the model accounts for
63 percent of the rise in net household debt and 44 percent of the rise in residential land prices
during 1997-2006. Conversely, when agents observe the ¯rst realization of the low-leverage regime,
they respond with a sharp correction in their beliefs and become unduly pessimistic, causing sharp
downward adjustments in credit, land prices and consumption.
This transition to the low-leverage regime is exogenous, and thus part of the collapse in credit
that the model produces is exogenous. For example, one can think of the switch of regimes as
being due to a disruption in ¯nancial intermediation, as in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). Note,
however, that the equilibrium declines in credit and prices in the model also re°ect the endogenous
ampli¯cation channel operating through the interaction of the collateral constraint and the agents'
beliefs. Quantitatively, our results indicate that this ampli¯cation mechanism is very strong and
accounts for most of the drop in credit and prices predicted by the model. The results also show
that the interaction between the debt-de°ation ¯nancial accelerator and the learning dynamics is
quantitatively signi¯cant. The model predicts e®ects on debt and asset prices that are nearly twice
as large when we allow for these two forces to interact than when we remove either one.
We model learning following the approach proposed by Cogley and Sargent (2008b). They o®er
an explanation of the equity premium puzzle by modeling a period of persistent pessimism caused
by the Great Depression. They assume high and low states for exogenous consumption growth, with
the true transition probabilities across these states unknown. Agents learn the true probabilities
over time as they observe the realizations of consumption growth. Similarly, in our setup, the true
probabilities of switching across leverage regimes are unknown, and agents learn about them over
time.
This paper is also related to the large Macro and Finance literatures on learning models. On
the macro side, the literature tends to focus on learning from noisy signals (e.g Blanchard et al.
(2008), Boz (2009), Boz et al. (2011), Edge et al. (2007), Lorenzoni (2009), Van Nieuwerburgh and
6The degree of optimism generated in the optimistic phase is at its highest just before agents observe the ¯rst
realization of the low-leverage regime. This occurs because, when the new ¯nancial environment is ¯rst introduced,
agents cannot rule out the possibility of the high-leverage regime being absorbent until they experience the ¯rst
realization of the low-leverage state.
6Veldkamp (2006), and the survey by Evans and Honkapohja (1999)). The informational friction in
models like ours, and Cogley and Sargent (2008b) is di®erent, because there is no signal extraction
problem. Agents observe realizations of the relevant variables without noise. Instead, there is
imperfect information about the true transition probability distribution of these variables. The
U.S. credit crisis provides a natural laboratory to study the e®ects of this class of learning models,
because the new ¯nancial products and the new regulatory regime under which they were traded
lacked the time-series data needed to infer the true probability of \catastrophic failure" of credit
markets (i.e., the probability of switching to a low-leverage regime). Our work is also reminiscent
of the literature on Knightian uncertainty where the agents do not know the true model with which
to assess the future. A recent application of Knightian uncertainty is Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2008), who emphasize unusual events and new ¯nancial instruments in increasing uncertainty and
potentially leading to crises.
The work of Zeira (1999) is closer in spirit to this paper. He argued that ¯nancial liberalization or
structural changes in productivity could be followed by booms and crashes because of \informational
overshooting." The similarity with our work is in the idea that agents need to learn the true
characteristics of a new asset pricing environment. In Zeira's model, this is captured by an increase
in dividend growth with an unknown duration and by assuming that agents update their beliefs
about a future date in which high dividend growth will end. As long as they observe high dividend
growth, their beliefs about future dividend realizations increase, leading to a boom in stock prices.
Then when agents ¯nally observe the end of the dividend boom, expectations of future pro¯ts fall
and hence asset prices collapse. In more recent related work, Adam et al. (2011) study housing
booms and current account imbalances in G7 countries using a learning model with a collateral
constraint in which Bayesian learning about housing prices ampli¯es the e®ects of interest rate cuts.
The credit constraint used in our model is similar to those widely examined in the macro litera-
ture on ¯nancial frictions and in the international macro literature on Sudden Stops. For example,
Jermann and Quadrini (2006) propose an RE model in which asset prices a®ect borrowing ability,
and use it to study the e®ects of ¯nancial innovation. Mendoza (2010) and Durdu et al. (2009)
develop models in which credit constraints linked to goods or asset prices produce Sudden Stops of
capital in°ows. When credit constraints like these are used in RE stochastic environments, precau-
tionary savings reduce signi¯cantly the long-run probability of states in which the constraints bind.
In our learning model, however, agents have much weaker incentives for building precautionary
savings than under rational expectations, until they attain the long-run equilibrium in which they
7know the true riskiness of the ¯nancial environment. Since agents borrow \too much" during the
optimistic phase, the economy is vulnerable to su®er a large credit crunch when the ¯rst switch to
a low-leverage regime occurs. In addition, our model di®ers from most ¯nancial crisis models in
that it aims to explain both the boom and bust credit cycles, whereas crisis models typically focus
only on the latter.
Our credit constraint also features the \systemic" pecuniary externality present in several mod-
els of ¯nancial crises. In particular, agents do not internalize the implications of their individual
actions on credit conditions because of changes in equilibrium prices, and this leads to \overborrow-
ing" relative to debt levels that would be acquired without the externality. Studies on overborrowing
like those by Uribe (2006), Korinek (2008), and Bianchi (2011) explore whether credit external-
ities can generate excessive borrowing in decentralized equilibria relative to a constrained social
optimum. Our paper makes two contributions to this line of research. First, we show that the
discovery of risk generates sizable overborrowing (relative to the RE decentralized equilibrium),
because of the unduly optimistic expectations of agents during the optimistic phase of the learning
dynamics. Second, we provide a new analysis of the interaction between the credit externality and
the underpricing of risk driven by a process of \risk discovery."
Finally, our paper is also related to some of the recent literature on the U.S. crisis that em-
phasizes learning frictions, ¯nancial innovation and deregulation, particularly the work of Howitt
(2011), Favilukis et al. (2010) and Ferrero (2012). Howitt studies the interaction of expectations,
leverage and a solvency constraint in a representative agent setup similar to ours, and he shows
that adaptive learning about asset returns leads to periods of \cumulative optimism" followed by
\cumulative pessimism," and this can lead to a crisis. Our analysis di®ers in that we study Bayesian
learning, instead of adaptive expectations, and we model learning about the persistence of a ¯nan-
cial regime, de¯ned in terms of the maximum leverage ratio speci¯ed by a collateral constraint.7
Favilukis et al. (2010) analyze the macroeconomic e®ects of housing wealth and housing ¯nance in
a heterogenous- agents, DSGE model with credit constraints. They study transition dynamics from
an environment with high ¯nancial transaction costs and tight credit limits to one with the opposite
features. Ferrero (2012) has a similar °avor in that he studies the macroeconomic implications of
relaxation of an LTV requirement. Similar to these two studies, our paper emphasizes the role
7There is also an interesting contrast across the two studies in terms of the motivation for focusing on learning to
study the ¯nancial crisis. Howitt argues that the learning friction matters because agents learn in adaptive fashion
about the behavior of asset returns, in a ¯nancial regime that is in fact unchanged, while we argue that it matters
because agents learn gradually the true persistence of a new ¯nancial regime, while they have perfect information
about the random process that drives dividends.
8of a relaxation of borrowing constraints, but we focus on the e®ects of imperfect information and
learning, while they study environments with rational expectations.
To close this Introduction, we do recognize that several factors beyond the scope of this paper
were at play in causing the credit booms and crises observed in the United States and elsewhere,
including excessive leverage and exposure to counterpart risk amongst ¯nancial intermediaries,
moral hazard in ¯nancial markets and rating agencies, reckless lending practices, growing global
¯nancial imbalances, and the lack of government supervision and regulation. In this paper, however,
we focus exclusively on the role of ¯nancial innovation a®ecting households' ability to leverage assets
into debt in an environment with imperfect information and imperfect credit markets. Our aim is
to show how these frictions alone can result in a pronounced boom-bust cycle in household debt
and housing prices.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the model and the learning
process. Section 3 examines the model's quantitative implications. Section 4 concludes.
2 A Model of Financial Innovation with Learning
We study a representative agent economy in which risk-averse individuals formulate optimal plans
facing exogenous income °uctuations. The risk associated with these °uctuations cannot be fully
diversi¯ed because asset markets are incomplete. Individuals have access to two assets: a non-
state-contingent bond and an asset in ¯xed supply (land). The credit market is imperfect, because
individuals' ability to borrow is limited not to exceed a fraction · of the market value of their land
holdings. That is, · imposes an upper bound on the agents' leverage ratio.
The main feature that di®erentiates our model from typical macro models with credit frictions
is the assumption that agents have imperfect information about the regime-switching probabilities
that drive °uctuations in ·.8 Speci¯cally, we model a situation in which ¯nancial innovation starts
with an initial shift from a low-leverage regime (·l) to a regime with higher ability to leverage (·h).
Agents do not know the true regime-switching probabilities between ·l and ·h in this new ¯nancial
environment. They are Bayesian learners, and in the long-run they learn these true probabilities
and form rational expectations. In the short-run, however, they form their expectations with the
posteriors they construct as they observe realizations of ·. Hence, they \discover" the true riskiness
8In previous work we studied a similar informational friction but in a setup in which the credit constraint does
not depend on market prices. In that scenario, the distortions produced by the learning process in the aftermath of
¯nancial innovation do not interact with the credit externality present in the model we study here.
9of the new ¯nancial environment only after they have observed a sample with enough regime
realizations and regime switches to estimate the true regime-switching probabilities accurately.
We assume that the risk-free interest rate is exogenous in order to keep the interaction between
¯nancial innovation and learning tractable. At the aggregate level, this assumption corresponds
to an economy that is small and open with respect to world capital markets. This is in line with
recent evidence suggesting that in the era of ¯nancial globalization even the U.S. risk-free rate has
been signi¯cantly in°uenced by outside factors, such as the surge in reserves in emerging economies
and the persistent collapse of investment rates in South East Asia after 1998 (see Warnock and
Warnock (2006), Bernanke (2005), Durdu et al. (2009), Mendoza et al. (2009)). Moreover, post-war
U.S. data from the Flow of Funds published by the Federal Reserve show that, while pre-1980s the
United States was in virtual ¯nancial autarky, because the fraction of net credit of U.S. non¯nancial
sectors ¯nanced by the rest of the world was close to zero, about one half of the surge in net credit
since the mid-1980s was ¯nanced by the rest of the world (see Mendoza and Quadrini (2010)).
Alternatively, our setup can be viewed as a partial equilibrium model of the U.S. economy that
studies the e®ects of ¯nancial innovation on household debt and residential land prices, taking the
risk-free rate as given, as in Corbae and Quintin (2009) and Howitt (2011). Still, we will evaluate
later on the robustness of our main results to relaxing the assumption of a constant real interest
rate by allowing it to fall as ¯nancial innovation starts, in line with what was observed in U.S. data.
2.1 Agents' Optimization Problem
Agents act atomistically in competitive markets and choose consumption (ct), land holdings (lt+1)
and holdings of one-period discount bonds (bt+1), taking as given the price of land (qt) and the









It is critical to note that Es
t represents expectations conditional on the representative agent's beliefs
formulated with the information available up to and including date t. As we explain below, these
beliefs will di®er in general from the rational expectations formulated with perfect information
about the persistence of the ¯nancial regime, which are denoted Ea
t .
10The agents' budget constraint is:




Agents operate a concave neoclassical production function g(lt) subject to a stochastic TFP shock
zt. A linear production technology could also be used, but we will use the curvature of g(lt) to
calibrate the model so that the condition that arbitrages returns across bonds and land is consistent
with U.S. data on the risk-free interest rate and the value of residential land as a share of GDP
(see Section 3 for details).
TFP shocks follow an exogenous discrete Markov process, about which agents have perfect
information. That is, they know the Markov transition matrix ¼(zt+1 j zt) and the corresponding
set Z of M possible realizations of z at any point in time (i.e., zt 2 Z = fz1 < z2 < :::: < zM)).
Alternatively, we could assume that TFP shocks are also a®ected by imperfect information.
Frictions in the credit market that we don't model explicitly force agents to comply with a
collateral constraint that limits the value of debt (given by bt+1=R since 1=R is the price of discount




In this constraint, ·t is a random variable that follows a \true" Markov process characterized by a
standard two-point, regime-switching process with regimes ·h and ·l, with ·h > ·l, and transition
probabilities given by Fa = pa(·t+1 j ·t).9 The continuation transition probabilities are denoted
Fa
hh ´ pa(·t+1 = ·h j ·t = ·h) and Fa
ll ´ pa(·t+1 = ·l j ·t = ·l); and the switching probabilities
are Fa
hl = 1 ¡ Fa
hh and Fa
lh = 1 ¡ Fa
ll. The long-run probabilities of the high- and low-leverage
regimes are ¦h = Fa
lh=(Fa
lh + Fa
hl) and ¦l = Fa
hl=(Fa
lh + Fa
hl) respectively, and the corresponding
mean durations are 1=Fa
hl and 1=Fa
lh. The long-run unconditional mean, variance, and ¯rst-order
9One could also specify a continuous AR(1) process for · such as ·t = mt +·t¡1 +²t. The di®erent regimes could
be captured with a shift in the mean: m 2 fm
h;m
lg and the agents could learn about the process governing m. We
conjecture that this speci¯cation would yield similar results as agents could turn optimistic about the persistence of
the high mean regime for ·.












As explained earlier, agents know ·h and ·l but do not know Fa: Hence, they make decisions
based on their beliefs characterized by Es
t which evolve over time. Using ¹ to denote the Lagrange















With the key caveat that agents use subjective beliefs to form expectations, these conditions are
standard from models with credit constraints. Following Mendoza (2010), we can show that the
second condition implies a forward solution for land prices in which the future stream of land




















De¯ning the return on land as R
q
t+1 ´ (zt+1g0(lt+1) + qt+1)=qt and the period marginal utility
















Thus, as in Mendoza (2010), the borrowing constraint enlarges the standard premium on land
holdings, driven by the covariance between marginal utility and asset returns, by introducing di-
rect and indirect e®ects. The direct e®ect is represented by the term (1¡·t)¹t. The indirect e®ects
are represented by the fact that the credit constraint hampers the agents' ability to smooth con-
sumption, which reduces covs
t(¸t+1;R
q
t+1), and tilts consumption towards the future, which lowers
Es
























The expressions in (10) and (11) imply that the collateral constraint lowers land prices because
it increases the rate of return at which future land dividends are discounted. Note also that land








for some i > 0.
While the above e®ects are at work even when expectations are formed rationally, with knowl-
edge of the true Markov process of ·, condition (11) also suggests that the learning process and the
collateral constraint interact in an important way. For instance, suppose the credit constraint was
binding at t. It follows that excess land returns must be lower in states with ·h than with ·l, since
the constraint must bind more in the latter. Hence, if beliefs are optimistic, agents assign more
probability to states with lower expected returns than under true rational expectations, and this,
via condition (11), translates into higher land prices, which in turn via the collateral constraint
results in higher debt. The opposite is also true: If beliefs are pessimistic, agents assign higher
probability to states with higher land returns, which depress current land prices more than under
rational expectations, and via the collateral constraint this results in even lower debt.
The economy has a ¯xed unit supply of land, hence market clearing in the land market implies
that the land holdings of the representative agent must satisfy lt = 1 for all t, and the rest of the






















2.2 General Features of the Learning Setup
Following Cogley and Sargent (2008b), our learning setup features two-point passive learning with-
out noise, so that the belief transition probability matrix denoted by ps
t(·t+1 j ·t) converges to
13its true value pa(·t+1 j ·t) for su±ciently large t. With this setup, agents learn about the true
regime-switching probabilities of · only after observing a su±ciently long set of realizations of ·h
and ·l.10
This learning setup ¯ts nicely our goal of studying a situation in which ¯nancial innovation
represents an initial condition with the arrival of a new state ·h and with imperfect information
about the true riskiness of this new environment. Agents are ignorant about the true transition
distribution of ·, since there is no data history to infer it from. Over time, if they observe a
sequence of realizations of ·h for a few periods, they build optimism by assigning a probability to
the possibility of continuing in ·h that is higher than the true value. We refer to this situation as
the \optimistic phase." Such optimism by itself is a source of vulnerability, because it is quickly
reversed into a \pessimistic phase" with the opposite characteristics as the ¯rst few realizations of
·l hit the economy. In addition, during the optimistic phase, the incentives to build precautionary
savings against the risk of a shift in the ability to leverage are weaker than in the long-run RE
equilibrium. This increases the agents' risk of being caught \o®-guard" (i.e., with too much debt)
when the ¯rst shift to the low-leverage regime occurs.
Modeling imperfect information in this fashion implies a deviation from rational expectations
in the sense that agents form expectations having only \partial" knowledge of the true stochastic
process driving °uctuations in ·.11 This is a key feature of our model, because it highlights the role
of the short history of a new ¯nancial regime in hampering the ability of agents to correctly assess
risk. This approach seems better suited for studying the role of ¯nancial innovation in causing the
¯nancial crisis, as opposed to a standard signal extraction problem.
Since · is exogenous, we are modeling a passive learning structure from and about exogenous
variables, which facilitates signi¯cantly the analysis and numerical solution of the model. In partic-
ular, it allows us to separate the evolution of beliefs from the dynamic optimization problem that
agents solve, because agents cannot bene¯t from experimenting with the latter in order to improve
the former. In light of this, we follow a two-stage solution strategy to analyze the model.
In the ¯rst stage, we use Bayesian learning to generate the agents' sequence of posterior density
functions ff(Fs j ·t)gT
t=1. Each of these density functions (one for each date t) is a probability
distribution over possible Markov transition matrices Fs. Since agents do not know the true
10Time alone does not determine how fast agents learn. The order in which · realizations, and switches between
realizations, occur also matters.
11In a more general sense, however, agents in our model are rational inasmuch as Bayesian expectations are rational
given the incomplete information on which they are based.
14transition matrix Fa, the density function changes with the sequence of realizations observed up
to date t (i.e.,
©
·t;·t¡1;:::;·1ª
where ·t = (·t;·t¡1;:::;·1)) and with the initial date-0 priors, as
we explain below. If date T is high enough to accommodate su±cient sampling of regime switches
across ·h and ·l; the sequence ff(Fs j ·t)gT
t=1 converges to a distribution with all its mass in Fa.
The second part of the solution characterizes the agent's optimal plans and the recursive equilib-
rium by adopting Kreps's Anticipated Utility (AU) approach to model dynamic optimization with
Bayesian learning. The AU approach focuses on combining the sequences of posterior densities
obtained in the ¯rst part, ff(Fs j ·t)gT
t=1, with chained solutions from a set of \conditional" AU
optimization problems. These problems are conditional on the posterior density function of Fs that
agents form with the history of realizations up to each date t. In contrast, full Bayesian dynamic
optimization takes into account projections of the e®ect of future · realizations on the evolution
of beliefs, but this is generally of limited tractability because it requires a large state space that
includes counters carrying the observed number of switches across regimes. Cogley and Sargent
(2008a) show, however, that the optimal consumption plans and asset prices obtained using AU
are very accurate approximations of those obtained with full Bayesian optimization, even in an
environment with incomplete markets, CRRA preferences (which induce precautionary savings),
and large regime-switching income shocks.12 The remainder of this Section examines in more detail
the Bayesian learning setup and the construction of the model's recursive AU equilibrium.
2.3 Learning and the Sequence of Beliefs
The learning framework takes as given an observed history of · realizations for T periods, denoted
·T; and a prior of Fs for date t = 0, p(Fs), and it yields a sequence of posteriors ff(Fs j ·t)gT
t=1.13
At every date t, from 0 to T, the information set of the agent includes ·t as well as the possible
values that · can take (·h and ·l).
Agents form posteriors using a beta-binomial probability model. Since information is imperfect
only with regard to the Markov transition matrix across ·0s, and because · can only take two
values, this boils down to imperfect information about Fa
hh and Fa
ll. The other two elements of the
transition matrix of · are recovered as the complements to these two.
12The quality of the approximation begins to deteriorate when the CRRA coe±cient is set higher than 5. In our
calibration it will be set at 2. On the other hand, the model examined by Cogley and Sargent (2008a) does not
feature a borrowing constraint, so we cannot guarantee that the approximation is as accurate as theirs even with the
CRRA coe±cient set at 2.
13In describing the learning problem, we employ the notation used by Cogley and Sargent (2008b).
15The agents' posteriors about Fs
hh and Fs
ll have Beta distributions as well, and the parameters
that de¯ne them are determined by the number of regime switches observed in a particular history
·t. As in Cogley and Sargent (2008b), we assume that the priors for Fs
hh and Fs
ll included in p(Fs)
are independent and determined by the number of transitions assumed to have been observed prior










0 denotes the number of transitions from state i to state j assumed to have been observed
prior to date 1.
The likelihood function of ·t conditional on Fs
hh and Fs
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Multiplying the likelihood function by the priors delivers the posterior kernel:
k(Fs j ·t) / (Fs
hh)(nhh
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and dividing the kernel using the normalizing constant M(·t) yields the posterior density:
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These properties are important because they show that the posterior means of the continuation
probability of a particular regime change only when that same regime is observed at date t. Since
in a two-point, regime-switching setup continuation probabilities also determine mean durations, it
follows that both the persistence and the mean durations of leverage regimes can be learned only
as the economy actually experiences ·l or ·h.14
Figure 4: Evolution of Beliefs

























Notes: This ¯gure plots the evolution of beliefs about F
s
hh (top panel), F
s
ll (middle panel), and the associated realiza-
tions of · (lower panel). The horizontal red lines in the upper two panels mark the true values of the corresponding
variables.




ll, are correlated, learning would likely be faster, because agents would update their




ll every period, instead of updating only one or the other depending on the regime they





ll and that the agents know about this property of the model. In this case, agents know an important
characteristic of the transition probability matrix (i.e. that is symmetric), which weakens the initial premise stating
that they do not know any of its properties. Agents would learn about the persistence of both regimes no matter
which one they observe.
17The potential for ¯nancial innovation to lead to signi¯cant underestimation of risk can be
inferred from the evolution of the posterior means. If ¯nancial innovation is de¯ned as the arrival
of a brand new environment in which credit conditions can shift between ·h and ·l, we should
assume that the learning process starts from values of n
ij
0 that are close to zero.15 Given this
assumption and the conditions governing the evolution of posterior means in eq. (20)), it follows
that the ¯rst sequence of realizations of ·h generates substantial optimism (i.e. a sharp increase
in Et[Fs
hh] relative to Fa
hh). Moreover, it also follows that the magnitude of the optimism that any
subsequent sequence of realizations of ·h generates will be smaller than in the initial optimistic
phase. Intuitively, this is because it is only after observing the ¯rst switch to ·l that agents rule
out the possibility of ·h being an absorbent state. Similarly, the ¯rst realizations of ·l generate
a pessimistic phase, in which Et[Fs
ll] is signi¯cantly higher than Fa
ll; so the period of optimistic
expectations is followed by a period of pessimistic expectations.
We illustrate further the learning dynamics of this setup by means of a simple numerical ex-
ample. We choose a set of values for Fa
hh, Fa
ll, and initial priors, and then simulate the learning
process for 300 quarters using a hypothetical sequence of · realizations produced by a stochastic
simulation of the true Markov-switching process. The results are plotted in Figure 4, which shows
the time paths of Et[Fs
hh] and Et[Fs
ll] based on the beliefs formed at each date t in the horizontal
axis, after observing the corresponding ·t shown in the bottom panel, and with the date-0 priors
set to Fs
hh » Beta(0:1;0:1) and Fs
ll » Beta(0:1;0:1). The true regime-switching probabilities are
set to Fa
hh = 0:95 and Fa
ll = 0:5, which are shown as the horizontal lines in the same plots as
Et[Fs
hh] and Et[Fs
ll]. All of these parameter values are used only for illustration purposes (they are
not calibrated to actual data as in the solution of the full model in Section 3).
The most striking result evident in Figure 4 is that ¯nancial innovation can lead to signi¯cant
underestimation of risk. Speci¯cally, the initial sequence of realizations of ·h observed until just
before the ¯rst realization of ·l (the ¯rst \optimistic phase") generates substantial optimism. In
this example, the optimistic phase covers the ¯rst 30 periods. The Figure shows that a high level
of optimism builds very fast during the optimistic phase. In fact, agents update their beliefs about
the persistence of the high-leverage regime from 0.5 to 0.916 just after observing ·1 = ·h, and
then in the subsequent 29 periods Et[Fs
hh] continues rising to peak at around 0.999. Optimism
never grows as large during other optimistic phases that occur later on. For example, even though
15A truly new environment would have n
ij
0 = 0; but since the binomial distribution is not de¯ned for n
ij
0 = 0; n
ij
0
close to zero provides the best approximation to a truly new regime.
18the economy remains in ·h from around date 40 to date 80, the optimism that this generates is
much smaller than in the initial optimistic phase. This is because, as noted above, it is only after
observing the ¯rst switch to ·l that agents rule out the possibility of ·h being an absorbent state.
Hence, Et[Fs
hh] cannot surge as high as it did during the initial optimistic phase. Notice also that
the ¯rst realizations of ·l generate a strong \pessimistic phase," in which Et[Fs
ll] is signi¯cantly
higher than Fa
ll; so the period of unduly optimistic expectations is followed by a period of unduly
pessimistic expectations.
Figure 4 also re°ects the result showing that the beliefs about Et[Fs
hh] and Et[Fs
ll] are updated
only when the economy is in the high- or low-leverage state. This is evident, for example, in the
initial optimistic phase, when Et[Fs
ll] does not change at all. This feature of the learning dynamics
also explains why in this example Et[Fs
hh] converges to its RE counterpart faster than Et[Fs
ll]. Given
that the low-leverage regime is visited much less frequently, it takes longer for the agents to learn
about its persistence.
2.4 Recursive Anticipated Utility Competitive Equilibrium
We de¯ne the model's AU competitive equilibrium in recursive form. Since in the quantitative
analysis we solve the model by policy function iteration on the equilibrium conditions (12)-(15), we
formulate the recursive equilibrium using these conditions instead of a Bellman equation (Appendix
A describes the solution method in detail). The state variables in the recursive equilibrium are
de¯ned by the triple (b;z;·).
The solution strategy works by breaking down the problem into a set of AU optimization
problems (AUOP) that are conditional on the beliefs agents have each period. We add time indices
to the policy and pricing functions in the recursive equilibrium so as to identify the date of the
beliefs that match the corresponding AUOP. This solution strategy works because the law of iterated
expectations still holds (see Appendix B in Cogley and Sargent (2008b)).
In each AUOP, agents form expectations about the future conditional on the information and
beliefs they have in the current planning period as summarized in the corresponding mean poste-
riors. As noted before, however, this is not the same as full Bayesian optimization, because this
requires carrying as additional state variables for date t the four-dimensional vector nt that includes
every possible permutation of the counters that can be observed up to date t. By contrast, the
AUOPs are analogous to solving a sequence of policy functions and Bellman equations one for each
19set of beliefs obtained at each date t = 1;:::;T. This is still a demanding computational problem,
but less vulnerable to the curse of dimensionality than the full Bayesian problem.16
Consider the date-t AUOP. At this point agents have observed ·t , and use it to update their
beliefs. Thus, we pull f(Fs j ·t) from the sequence of posterior density functions solved for in
the ¯rst part of our solution strategy. This is the posterior about the distribution of Fs that
agents form, given that they have observed ·t and given their initial priors. Using (20), we
compute Et[Fs
hh] and Et[Fs
ll] and construct the date-t transition probability matrix Es
t[·0j·] ´ 2
4 Et[Fs






5: The solution to the date-t AUOP is then given by policy functions
(b0
t(b;z;·);ct(b;z;·);¹t(b;z;·)) and a pricing function qt(b;z;·) that satisfy the equilibrium con-
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The time subscripts that index the policy and pricing functions indicate the date of the beliefs
used to form the expectations (which is also the date of the most recent observation of ·, which is
date t). Equations (21)-(24) incorporate the market-clearing condition in the land market, which
requires l = 1. Moreover, given (21)-(22), the pricing function qt(b;z;·) satis¯es the asset pricing
equation (11).
It is critical to note that solving for date-t policy and pricing functions means solving for a full
set of optimal plans over the entire state space (b;z;·) and conditional on date-t beliefs. Thus,
we are solving for the optimal plans agents \conjecture" they would make over the in¯nite future
acting under those beliefs. For characterizing the \actual" equilibrium dynamics to match against
the data, however, the solution of the date-t AUOP determines optimal plans for date t only. This
16Intuitively, the AU approach captures the risk of °uctuations in future ·
0s but not the uncertainty about future
changes in their transition probabilities, while the Bayesian optimization captures both.
20is crucial because beliefs change as time passes, and each subsequent ·t is observed, which implies
that the policy and pricing functions that solve each AUOP also change. Thus, history matters
for the full solution of the model because assuming di®erent histories ·t yields di®erent sequences
of beliefs, and hence di®erent sets of policy functions. If at any two dates t and t + j we give the
agents the same values for (b;z;·); they in general will not choose the same bond holdings for the
following period because Es
t[·0j·] and Es
t+j[·0j·] will di®er.
We can now de¯ne the model's recursive AU equilibrium as follows:
De¯nition Given a T-period history of realizations ·T = (·T;·T¡1;:::;·1); a recursive AU compet-
itive equilibrium for the economy is given by a sequence of functions [b0
t(b;z;·);ct(b;z;·);¹t(b;z;·)]T
t=1
and pricing functions [qt(b;z;·)]T
t=1 such that: (a) b0
t(b;z;·);ct(b;z;·);¹t(b;z;·) and qt(b;z;·)
solve the date-t AUOP conditional on Es
t[·0j·]; (b) Es
t[·0j·] is the conjectured transition probabil-
ity matrix of · produced by the date-t posterior density of Fs determined by the Bayesian passive
learning process summarized in Equation (19).
Intuitively, the complete solution of the recursive equilibrium is formed by chaining together the
solutions for each date-t AUOP. That is, the equilibrium dynamics at each date t = 1;:::T for a par-




t=1. At each date
in this sequence, b0
t(b;z;·);ct(b;z;·);¹t(b;z;·);qt(b;z;·); are the recursive functions that solve the
corresponding date's AUOP using Es
t[·0j·] to form expectations. Hence, the sequence of equilibrium
decision rules for bond holdings that the model predicts for dates t = 1;:::;T would be obtained by
chaining the relevant decision rules as follows: b2 = b0
1(b;z;·); b3 = b0
2(b;z;·);:::; bT+1 = b0
T(b;z;·):
3 Quantitative Analysis
In this section we calibrate the model to U.S. data and study its quantitative predictions for the
following ¯nancial innovation experiment: At t = 1, ¯nancial innovation begins with the ¯rst
realization of ·h; followed by an optimistic phase in which ·h continues for J periods. At date
J +1 the ¯rst realization of ·l occurs, and the ¯nancial regime remains in state ·l from dates J +1
to T.
3.1 Baseline Calibration
The functional forms for preferences and technology are standard: u(ct) =
c1¡¾
t
1¡¾ and g(lt) = l®
t : The
calibration requires setting values for the parameters (®;¯;¾;R), the Markov process for z, and the




0 , J and T. We propose a
set of baseline calibration parameters based on U.S. data, and later we conduct sensitivity analysis
to evaluate the robustness of the results to changes in the baseline calibration.
We calibrate the model to a quarterly frequency at annualized rates. The beginning of the
¯nancial innovation experiment is dated as of 1997Q1. This is in line with the observations that
1997 was the year in which the ¯rst CDS was issued at JPMorgan and the ¯rst publicly-available
securitization of loans under the New Community Reinvestment Act took place. Moreover, 1997 is
also the year in which the net credit assets-GDP ratio shown in Figure 1 started on its declining
trend. We date the start of the ¯nancial crisis as of 2007Q1, to match the early stages of the
subprime mortgage crisis after the Fall of 2006. This is also in line with the observation that the
net fraction of banks reporting tighter standards for mortgage loans jumped signi¯cantly to 16
percent in 2007Q1, as shown in Figure 3.17
The above timing assumptions imply that the ¯rst realization of ·h occurred in 1997Q1 and ·h
continued to be observed trough 2006Q4. Hence, the optimistic phase lasts J = 40 quarters. The
¯rst realization of ·l occurred in 2007Q1 and ·l continued to be observed through at least 2008Q4.
Thus, the learning period has a total length of T = 48 quarters, in which the ¯rst 40 realizations
of · are ·h and the remaining 8 are ·l.
In the pre-¯nancial-innovation period, before 1997, we assume that there was only one ¯nancial
regime with · = ·l; and hence the only source of uncertainty were TFP shocks. The values
of (®;¯;¾;R) and ·l are then set so that the model's stochastic stationary state under these
assumptions is consistent with various averages from U.S. data from the pre-¯nancial-innovation
period reported next.
We set the real interest rate to 2.66 percent annually. This is the average ex-post real interest
rate on U.S. three-month T-bills during the period 1980Q1-1996Q4.
Our data proxy for b are the net credit market assets of U.S. households and non-pro¯t organi-
zations in the Flow of Funds data set, and our proxy for ql is the series on the value of residential
land estimated by Davis and Heathcote (2007). These are the data plotted in Figure 1 as shares of
GDP. The 1980Q1-1996Q4 average ratios of the value of residential land and net credit market as-
sets relative to GDP are 0.477 and -0.313 respectively. The two ratios are fairly stable around these
17These dates are broadly in line with those assumed by Campbell and Hercowitz (2009), who study the welfare
implications of a transition from a high- home-equity-requirement regime to a low-equity-requirement regime. They
assume that the former corresponds to the 1982-1994 period, while the latter starts in 1995.
22averages throughout the 1980Q1-1996Q4 period, in contrast with the sharp trends they display
after 1996.
As described in the Introduction, we construct a macro estimate of the household leverage ratio,
or the actual loan-to-value ratio, by dividing net credit market assets by the value of residential
land. Then, we set the value of ·l by combining the 1980Q1-1996Q4 average of this ratio with the
calibrated value of R (assuming also that the collateral constraint was binding in the pre-¯nancial-
innovation era). This yields ·l = 0:659=1:0266 = 0:642. The fact that net credit assets and land
values were fairly stable prior to 1997 (see Figure 1) supports the idea of using this constant value
of ·l to characterize the pre-¯nancial-innovation regime, and the fact that by end 2010 the median
downpayment on conventional mortgages had bounced back to what it was a decade earlier (see
Feb. 16, 2011 Wall Street Journal) supports idea of setting ·l in the new regime to be the same as
in the pre-¯nancial-innovation era.
The value of ·h is set equal to the 2006Q4 leverage ratio, hence ·h = 0:926. This represents the
largest leverage ratio that the economy was able to support in the new ¯nancial regime just before
the ¯nancial crisis hit.18 Note, however, that ·h does not always bind in the new regime. First, as
the economy moves from the pre-¯nancial-innovation regime to the regime with stochastic ·, agents
build up debt over time, and hence the equilibrium leverage ratio does not jump to its new ceiling
immediately as the new regime begins. Second, the new regime features two possible realizations
of · that are occasionally binding, so ·h only binds with some probability in the long-run.
The value of ¾ is set to ¾ = 2:0, the standard value in quantitative DSGE models, and ¯ is set
so that the pre-¯nancial-innovation model matches the observed standard deviation of consumption
relative to output over the 1980Q1-1996Q4 period, which is 0.8. This procedure yields ¯ = 0:91.
Notice that, given the calibrated value of R, the rate of time preference exceeds the real interest
rate (i.e., ¯R = 0:934 < 1). This is important because it ensures the existence of an ergodic
distribution of bond holdings given that asset markets are incomplete. Intuitively, this occurs
because of the interaction between the precautionary savings motive, which pushes for increasing
bond holdings, and the incentive to tilt consumption towards the present, and hence reduce bond
holdings, because ¯R < 1. Consumption tilting and precautionary savings will also play a key role
later in our analysis of the macro dynamics induced by ¯nancial innovation.
18Our calibrated values of ·
h and ·
l are in line with the parameter values that Favilukis et al. (2010) chose to
calibrate their collateral constraint (0.75 in their tight credit regime and 1 in their loose credit environment).
23Using the 1980Q1-1996Q4 average of the value of residential land to GDP, the value of R, and
the condition that arbitrages the returns on land and bonds, which follows from the optimality
conditions (12)-(13), we obtain and implied value for ®.19 This yields ® = 0:0251.
We normalize mean output to 1 (since L = 1 and the unconditional mean of z also equals 1), and
calibrate the model so that the observed average pre-¯nancial-innovation ratios of consumption (¹ c)
and bonds (¹ b) to GDP are consistent with the resource constraint in the average of the stochastic
stationary state for that ¯nancial regime.20 The observed average ratio of net credit assets to
GDP in the 1980Q1-1996Q4 period yields ¹ b = ¡0:313. In the case of the consumption-GDP ratio,
the data show a slight trend, so we use the last observation of the pre-¯nancial-innovation regime
(1996Q4). This implies ¹ c = 0:670. To make these values of ¹ b and ¹ c consistent with the resource
constraint in the average of the stochastic steady state, we need to take into account the fact that
investment and government absorption are included in the data but not in the model. To adjust
for this discrepancy, we introduce a ¯xed, exogenous amount of autonomous spending A, so that
the long-run average of the resource constraint is 1 = ¹ c + A ¡ ¹ b(R ¡ 1)=R . Given ¹ b = ¡0:313,
¹ c = 0:6707 and R = 1:0266 the value of A follows as a residual A = 1 ¡ ¹ c +¹ b(R ¡ 1)=R = 0:321.
Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values
¯ Discount factor (annualized) 0.91
¾ Risk aversion coe±cient 2.0
c Consumption-GDP ratio 0.670
A Lump-sum absorption 0.321
r Interest rate (annualized) 2.660
½ Persistence of endowment shocks 0.869
¾e Standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.008
® Factor share of land in production 0.025
L Supply of land 1.0
·h Value of · in the high securitization regime 0.926
·l Value of · in the low securitization regime 0.642
Fa
hh True persistence of ·h 0.964
Fa




19Since the model with a single ¯nancial regime set at ·
l (i.e., the pre-¯nancial-innovation regime) yields a collateral
constraint that is almost always binding and a negligible excess return on land, we use the approximation E[R
q] ¼ R,
and then conditions (12) and ( 13) imply: ® = (ql=zl
®)[R ¡ 1 + ¯
¡1(1 ¡ ¯R)(1 ¡ ·
l)]
20Consumption and GDP data are from the International Financial Statistics of the IMF.
24The Markov process for z is set to approximate an AR(1) process (ln(zt) = ½ln(zt¡1)+et) ¯tted
to HP-¯ltered real U.S. GDP per capita using data for the period 1965Q1-1996Q4. The estimation
yields ½ = 0:869 and ¾e = 0:00833, which imply a standard deviation of TFP of ¾z = 1:68 percent.
We use Tauchen and Hussey (1991)'s quadrature method to construct a Markov approximation to
this process assuming a vector of 9 realizations. The transition probability matrix and realization
vector are available on request.
The remaining parameters to calibrate are the initial priors of the learning process (the n
ij
0
counters). As shown in the previous Section, these priors are a key component of the model
because, together with the realizations of ·, they drive the magnitude and the speed with which
optimism and pessimism °uctuate. The Bayesian learning imposes analytical discipline on how
optimism and pessimism evolve, while the calibration of the priors imposes quantitative discipline
on how much the model is allowed to rely on these °uctuations for explaining credit booms and
busts.




0 , so that there
is only one counter to calibrate. We calibrate n0 so that the model matches an estimate of the
observed excess return on land relative to the risk free rate for 1997Q2, which corresponds to the
one-period-ahead expected excess return in the ¯rst date of the ¯nancial innovation experiment
(date 1 in the experiment corresponds to 1997Q1). The data proxy for this excess return is the
1997Q2 spread on the Fannie Mae residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) with 30-year
maturity over the T-bill rate. The Bloomberg data service reports this excess return at 47.6 basis
points, and the model matches it if we set n0 = 0:0205.21
Two caveats about the above approach to calibrate the priors: First, \raw" spreads on 30 year
RMBS include prepayment risk that tends to widen spreads, but Bloomberg reports also \option-
adjusted spreads" that are adjusted for this risk. We chose to use this measure because we do not
explicitly model prepayment risk (the raw spread is 117.6 basis points). Second, since the model
calibration is at a quarterly frequency, ideally we would have liked to use excess returns for securities
with a quarterly maturity. However, RMBSs do not have such short-term maturities, because the
underlying assets tend to be long-term mortgages. Still, using the spread for the 30-year RMBS is
useful because it should actually make it harder for the model to generate optimism. This is because
21An alternative calibration strategy would be to set n0 such that the model matches the increase in household
debt or leverage observed in the data. In a previous version of this paper we found that matching the former yields
an n0 lower than 0.0205, which strengthens the buildup of optimism and the surge in land prices and debt during
the optimistic phase.
2530-year RMBSs generally have higher spreads than securities with a quarterly maturity, and higher
spreads are associated with higher values of n0, which weakens the mechanism generating optimism
and pessimism in the learning process. Thus, by calibrating the priors to match the excess returns
of the 30-year RMBS we are looking at a \lower bound" of the optimism that the model can
generate.
Figure 5 shows the density functions of the initial priors of Fs
hh and Fs




0 ) pairs. The Beta(0:0205;0:0205) distribution corresponds to the baseline
calibration we just described. In this case, the priors have a U-shaped distribution with most of
the mass concentrated around 0 and 1. Since this case assumes n0 = nii
0 = n
ij
0 , the distribution
is symmetric with a mean of 0.5 (and a variance of 0.240). By contrast, consider the Beta(1;1)
distribution, which implicitly assumes that at least one observation of switch and continuation of
each · regime has been observed. This distribution also has a mean of 0.5, but the distribution is
uniform over the (0,1) range, and it has a much lower variance (0.083 v. 0.240).
Figure 5 also plots the Beta(40;0:0205) distribution, which matches the beliefs about Fs
hh
that the learning process generates at period 40 of the ¯nancial innovation experiment. At this
point, agents have observed 40 transitions from ·h to ·h and thus form beliefs characterized by a
distribution that is highly skewed to the right, with most of the mass concentrated around 1. This
re°ects the high degree of optimism that the learning process creates.
Figure 5: Beta Distributions
























26We illustrate further how the calibrated initial priors in°uence the evolution beliefs by studying
how Et[Fs
hh] and Et[Fs
ll] change over time as the sequence of realizations of · is observed. The U-
shaped distributions of Fs
hh and Fs
ll supported by the calibrated priors imply that agents conjecture
that there are four \most likely" scenarios before the ¯rst realization of · is observed: a) Both
the high- and low-leverage regimes are extremely persistent, i.e., Fs
hh ¼ 1 and Fs
ll ¼ 1; b) The
high-leverage regime is extremely persistent and the economy switches to the low-leverage regime
rarely and for a short time, i.e., Fs
hh ¼ 1 and Fs
ll ¼ 0; c) The low-leverage regime is extremely
persistent and the high-leverage regime occurs rarely and has a short duration, i.e., Fs
hh ¼ 0 and
Fs
ll ¼ 1, d) Neither regime is persistent and the economy constantly moves between the two, i.e.,
Fs
hh ¼ 0 and Fs
ll ¼ 0 . After observing the ¯rst few realizations of ·h, however, the agents can rule
out scenarios c) and d).
Beyond the initial realization of ·h, observing the long initial spell of ·h leads agents to become
optimistic about the persistence of this regime very quickly. In the baseline Beta(0:0205;0:0205)
case, Et[Fs
hh] jumps to about 0.98 in just one quarter, while with Beta(1;1) the buildup of optimism
is more gradual, but still after 8 quarters Et[Fs
hh] approaches 90 percent. This rapid adjustment
of beliefs also occurs with the surge of pessimism that follows the ¯rst observation of ·l in period
41: With Beta(0:0205;0:0205), agents update Et[Fs
ll] from 0.5 to almost 1 in period 41, and with
Beta(1;1) the change is slower but again by period 48, Et[Fs
ll] approaches 90 percent.
It is important to note that neither Beta(0:0205;0:0205) or Beta(1;1) bias the initial priors in
favor of optimism or pessimism. This di®ers from the approach followed by Cogley and Sargent
(2008b), who studied the implications of inducing initial pessimism into the agents' priors. In our
calibration, agents are not optimistic prior to period 1 because Beta(0:0205;0:0205) yields initial
beliefs such that Et[Fs
hh] = Et[Fs
ll] = 0:5.
A second important feature of the evolution of beliefs is that, even tough the changes in Et[Fs
hh]
between periods 1 and 40 are small, they still imply nontrivial changes in the agent's perceived
riskiness of the ¯nancial environment. For example, for t = 1 we obtained E1[Fs
hh] = 0:98, which
implies that the perceived mean duration of ·h is 50 quarters and the coe±cient of variation of
· is about 5.9 percent. In contrast, for t = 40 we have E1[Fs
hh] = 0:999, which is not that
di®erent from 0:98; but implies a much higher perceived mean duration of ·h (1000 quarters) and
much lower coe±cient of variation of · (1.3 percent). As we show below, this reduces incentives
for precautionary savings signi¯cantly. Moreover, these e®ects are very nonlinear, with the mean
duration exploding to 1 as Et[Fs
hh] approaches 1 from below.
27At this point we have calibrated all of the parameters that are needed for solving the model.
Notice in particular that the true transition probability matrix Fa is not needed. Solving the
AUOPs requires the sequence of beliefs (ff(Fs j ·t)gT
t=0), which is determined with the parameters
we already set, but does not require Fa. Still, calibrating Fa is necessary if we want to compare
the solutions of the learning model against the standard RE solution.
We calibrate Fa
hh so that the mean duration of high-leverage regimes is in line with the estimated
duration of credit boom episodes in industrial economies, which Mendoza and Terrones (2012)
estimated at about 7 years. This implies Fa
hh = 0:964. With this calibration of Fa
hh and conditional
on observing ·h at date 1, the probability of observing ·h the following 39 periods is 0.241. Thus,
the \true" probability of observing the long spell of ·h that we assume in our ¯nancial innovation
experiment, which produces substantial optimism, is about 1/4. We assume a symmetric process
by setting Fa
ll = 0:964.
An interesting implication of calibrating the \true" process of · in this way is that the model
features a long-run credit cycle consistent with average duration features of actual credit cycles,
so that agents eventually learn that the economy will display a credit cycle with the duration and
frequency that is typical of industrial countries. In the short-run, however, their expectations can
deviate sharply from these regularities, along the lines of Reinhart and Rogo® (2009) \this-time-
is-di®erent" argument.
3.2 Quantitative Findings
The quantitative analysis is based on four sets of results derived from the numerical solutions:
Long-run distributions of bond positions, forecast functions of macroeconomic aggregates, average
changes in these aggregates at the \turning points" of the learning experiment, and expected excess
returns. We compare the results of the baseline learning model (BL) with the RE model (i.e., a
model which retains the collateral constraint but does not have a learning friction) and with a
¯xed land valuation-learning (FVL) model in which land in the collateral constraint is valued at
a constant price set to the long-run average (i.e., a model that retains the learning friction but
removes the credit externality and the Fisherian de°ation channel). In this case, the collateral
constraint becomes
bt+1
R ¸ ¡·t¹ qlt+1.
283.2.1 Ergodic distributions
Figure 6 plots \conjectured" ergodic distributions of b for dates 1, 8, 40, 41 and 48 in the BL
model and the true ergodic distribution of the RE model. We label the former as \conjectured"
because the actual ergodic distribution of the BL model is the same as the one of the RE model,
since in the long-run agents learn Fa; and thus the long-run equilibrium is the same as under
rational expectations. The \conjectured" ergodic distributions for the other dates in the learning
experiment are the agents' projections of what the long-run equilibrium would look like if they
forecast the dynamics of the ¯nancial regime using their current beliefs. Plotting the conjectured
and RE long-run distributions together is useful for illustrating the impact of the optimism and
pessimism driving the model's dynamics on the agents \willingness" to borrow or save. Appendix
B provides details on the computation of these long-run distributions.
Figure 6: Ergodic Distributions of Bond Holdings














Notes: This ¯gure plots the ergodic distribution of bond holdings implied by the learning model in periods 1 (initial
period), 8, 40 (peak of optimism), 41, and 48 as well that of the rational expectations model marked by \RE."
Consider ¯rst the conjectured distribution for period 1. Recall that the mean of bond holdings
pre-¯nancial-innovation was -0.31. Hence, already by period 1 agents conjecture that the support
of the long-run distribution of bonds will shift sharply to the left (i.e. support higher debt levels).
But comparing the period-1 distribution with the new RE distribution for the regime-switching ·
process post-¯nancial-innovation, it is clear that agents are also projecting to be saving much less
than they eventually will in the new stochastic steady state. The RE distribution has the typical
29bimodal shape of a two-point regime-switching process with high persistence. In this case, agents
are assessing the risk of the ¯nancial environment correctly, and in particular they are aware that
long spells of both · regimes are possible.
Compare now the RE ergodic distribution with the conjectured ergodic distribution for period 40
in the BL model. Large debt ratios (bond holdings in the interval [-0.59, -0.54]) are never a long-run
equilibrium outcome in the RE model, but they take most of the mass of the long-run distribution
of bond holdings that is projected on the basis of the agents' period-40 beliefs. Something similar
happens also much earlier than date 40 because, as shown before, it takes observing only the ¯rst
few realizations of ·h for agents to turn very optimistic relative to the RE transition probabilities.
By period 8 agents already conjecture that debt positions in the [-0.54,-0.49] range are most likely
long-run equilibria, while in the RE ergodic distribution they have zero probability.
As optimism builds, the highest debt conjectured to have positive long-run probability rises,
and the mass of probability assigned to debt levels larger than the largest debt under rational
expectations also rises. This process peaks at the peak of the optimistic phase in date 40. In short,
during this phase, agents are willing to \overborrow" (take on more debt at the averages of the
conjectured ergodic distributions of b) than what is ever optimal in the RE model, and \undersave"
(build less precautionary savings, or conjecture they can attain a lower average of b) than what is
optimal in the RE model. When the ¯rst realization of ·l hits and the pessimistic phase starts,
the opposite e®ects take over and they peak at date 48. By then, agents are \underborrowing" and
\oversaving" substantially. However, they have learned from their experience that shifts to ·h are
possible, so the period-48 conjectured distribution is now two-peaked.
3.2.2 Forecast functions
Forecast functions are useful for illustrating the model's equilibrium dynamics during the 48 periods
of the learning experiment. We construct these forecast functions by using the sequence of beliefs
and decision rules of each AUOP to trace the dynamics of the expected values of the endogenous
variables along the model's AU recursive equilibrium path. Intuitively, the algorithm that computes
the forecast functions uses a law of motion for the evolution of the probability of the economy being
in each triple (b;z;·) as we move from date 0 to date 48. This law of motion can be computed for
any triple of initial conditions (b;z;·), but we are interested in the triple that approximates the
state of the U.S. economy in 1996Q4 (i.e. the initial conditions at the beginning of date 1 in the
¯nancial innovation experiment). Thus, we start at date 1 with all the probability concentrated in
30the coordinate of initial conditions (b1;z1;·h) where b1 = ¡0:345 (the observed net credit assets as
a share of GDP for 1996Q4) and z1 = 1. Then, for each subsequent date, the value of · is set to
the corresponding realization in the ·T sequence (·h for t = 2;:::;40 and ·l for t = 41;:::;48), the
transitions across values of z are computed with the Markov process of z, and the transitions across
points in the state space of b are governed by the policy function b0
t(b;z;·) of the corresponding
date-t AUOP. The procedure is similar to the standard forecast functions of a RE model, except




t=1 (see Appendix B for details).
Figure 7 plots the forecast functions for the choice of bond holdings as a share of output (b0=y),
consumption, the price of land, and the savings rate (GSF=y) as percent deviations from their
long-run means in the BL, RE and FVL models. Recall that long-run means in the learning and
RE models are identical because the ergodic distributions of the two are the same. The solid (blue)
lines correspond to the BL model, the dashed (green) lines are for the FVL model, and the dotted
(red) lines represent the RE model. Note that even the RE model generates some dynamics in this
exercise, because the initial condition b1 is not the long-run mean of the new ¯nancial regime with
stochastic ·, and also because we are using a particular time series of realizations of · (instead
of averaging across possible · realizations at each date t). Thus, these forecasts functions are
conditional on the particular history ·T that we assumed.
The forecast functions for bonds in Panel (a) show that during the optimistic phase agents
consistently borrow more in the BL model than in both the RE and FVL models. In the ¯rst two
periods after ¯nancial innovation is introduced, the three models predict similar debt dynamics,
but after that the optimism and the debt-de°ation feedback loop at work in the BL model produce
a much larger decline in bond holdings, while the bond dynamics in the RE and FVL models are
similar.22 b0=y declines by as much as 21 percentage points below the long-run average at the
peak of optimism of the BL model in period 40. These dynamics are in line with the downward
trend in household debt observed in the data (see Figure 1). Interestingly, the combination of the
learning friction and the debt-de°ation channel delivers a much stronger decline in assets than the
alternatives that retain only one of the two mechanisms. In the RE model there is no buildup of
optimism to push for overborrowing, and in the FVL model there is no endogenous feedback from
higher land prices into higher collateral and thus higher borrowing ability.
22This occurs because (a) in the FVL model the price is ¯xed at the long-run average of the RE model, and (b)
the RE price displays very small deviations from its long-run average. As a result, and since the values of · are the
same in both models, the debt allowed by the collateral constraint in both models is about the same.
31Figure 7: Forecast Functions
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Notes: This ¯gure plots the forecast functions of bond holdings-output ratio, price of land, consumption, and
gross saving °ow-output ratio (GSF/y) as percentage deviations from their long run means implied by the rational
expectations scenario. GSF/y is calculated as ((b
0=R) ¡ b)=y. Realizations of · are as described in the text, ·
h in
the ¯rst 40 periods and ·
l in the remaining 8. Date-0 b
0=y is the 1996:Q4 observation from data (since debt data
are end of period basis), so that the date-1 b
0=y is the ¯rst endogenous choice of b
0 under ·
h, given an initial state
determined by the data point from 1996:Q4. \FVL" refers to the scenario with the asset price on the right hand side
of the credit constraint ¯xed at 0.456 which is the long run average of prices.
32The switch to the pessimistic phase in period 41 brings about a large correction in bond holdings,
which bounce back about 54 percentage points in the BL model. An adjustment of this magnitude
is an equilibrium outcome, despite CRRA preferences and incomplete markets, because the arrival
of the ¯rst realization of ·l at date 41 is almost like a large, unexpected shock, in the sense that by
date 40 agents believe that the state ·h in which they have been living is almost absorbent (i.e.,
E40[Fs
hh] is very close to 1). Moreover, the · shock triggers a large Fisherian de°ation e®ect (see
below), which contributes to enlarge the debt adjustment. Bond holdings also jump up in the RE
and FVL models, because of the switch from ·h to ·l in a state in which the collateral constraint
was binding. But the adjustments are much smaller. The debt reversal in the RE case is about half
the size of that in the learning model, and it re°ects the e®ect of the debt-de°ation mechanism in
the absence of a switch to pessimistic beliefs. The FVL model yields the smallest correction, which
isolates the e®ect of the switch to pessimistic beliefs without ampli¯cation due to the Fisherian
de°ation channel.
As agents overborrow during the optimistic phase in the BL model, they also bid more aggres-
sively for the risky asset. This increases the price of land signi¯cantly, as shown in Panel (b) of
Figure 7. This contrasts with the RE case, in which the price of land declines slightly relative to
the pre-¯nancial-innovation price that prevailed at date 0. This occurs because the price of land in
the RE model is falling to a lower long-run average in the ¯nancial innovation regime. In turn, the
mean price of land in the RE model (with stochastic ·) is lower than in the pre-¯nancial-innovation
regime (with constant ·l) because, even though agents know the true distribution of ·, they now
face uncertainty about ·, since it is now a random variable. Hence, ¯nancial innovation implies a
higher mean · but also a higher variance of ·. The former enables the agents to borrow more, and
therefore demand more of the risky asset and bid up its price, but the latter gives them an incentive
to hold less of the risky asset, because the new ¯nancial environment is riskier and they are risk
averse. We ¯nd that, if the gap between ·h and ·l is small, the \mean e®ect" dominates leading to
higher land prices in the RE model, but as the gap widens, the \variance e®ect" becomes stronger
and the mean land price in the RE model is lower than in the pre-¯nancial-innovation equilibrium
(as is the case in our baseline calibration).
The FVL model generates a larger asset price boom during the optimistic phase and a smaller
price crash compared with the other two models. This is because the FVL model rules out the
Fisherian de°ation by construction, and hence at date 41 the downward spiral on land prices,
collateral values, and debt that is at work in the other two models is not active here. Moreover, the
33¯xed land valuation for collateral also serves as a limited asset price guarantee, which produces a
larger price boom during the optimistic phase than in the learning and RE models. The guarantee
is limited because it applies only for the valuation of land used as collateral. Accordingly, the FVL
model produces a smaller reversal in debt in period 41, as agents are able to borrow more than in
the other two models because of the constant collateral price. For the same reason, the larger land
price increase in the optimistic phase does not feed back into a large debt expansion.
Panels (c) and (d) of Figure 7 show the forecast functions for the savings rate and consumption.
Because of the large magnitude of the changes that occur at date 41, Panels (e) and (f) \zoom-in"
on the dynamics of these variables in the ¯rst 30 periods.
To understand the consumption dynamics, consider ¯rst what these dynamics would look like
in a perfect-foresight model where we switch from the constrained pre-¯nancial innovation steady
state with ·l to a hypothetical ¯nancial innovation deterministic steady state for a regime with
·h. These two steady states are corner solutions because ¯R < 1, and hence the steady state of
bonds is b = ¡·q (·), where q(·) is the steady state land price, which is increasing in ·.23 Thus,
the increase in · yields a lower steady state for b (higher steady state debt) because both · and
q(·) increase. But higher steady state debt means lower steady state consumption, since the non-
¯nancial wealth of the economy is invariant to changes in · and the debt has to be serviced. Thus,
¯nancial innovation tilts the time pro¯le of consumption. On impact, when · is ¯rst increased,
and for a few periods after that, consumption rises above the pre-¯nancial-innovation level as the
collateral constraint is relaxed, but then it drops monotonically until it reaches its new steady
state below the pre-¯nancial-innovation level. This consumption tilting e®ect is also at work in
the stochastic model, but is weaker because of the precautionary savings motive, which implies a
smaller decrease in bond holdings and a smaller drop in consumption.
Now consider the consumption dynamics of the BL, RE and FVL models in Panels (c) and (e)
of Figure 7. The fact that the dynamics for the ¯rst 40 periods are similar in all three models
indicates that the consumption tilting e®ect dominates these dynamics. This is because consump-
tion converges quickly to its new long-run average (which is identical in the BL and RE models,
and very similar in the FVL model). There is over-consumption in the BL model relative to the
RE and FVL models in the early stages after the switch to ·h, because of the larger increase in
debt (i.e., decline in bond holdings). In the ¯rst two periods, consumption is about the same in all
23The closed-form solution for the steady state land price with the collateral constraint binding is: q(·) =
(®¯)=[¯(R ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ¯R)(1 ¡ ·)]:
34three models, but the overconsumption in the BL model is clear between the 3rd and 10th periods.
After period 10, however, the dynamics driven by consumption tilting dominate in all three models.
Consumption then remains smooth (as we are averaging across TFP and keeping · constant at ·h),
until we arrive at date 41 and · switches to ·l.
At date 41, as explained earlier, the · switch is almost like a large, unexpected shock in the BL
and FVL models. In the BL model, which also has the Fisherian de°ation, this produces a dramatic
collapse in consumption. This is in line with the ¯ndings in Mendoza (2010) and Mendoza and
Smith (2006), showing that in Fisherian de°ation models there are equilibria outside the ergodic
distribution of wealth, where the economy could land as a result of unexpected shocks, in which the
impact response of consumption can be around -80 percent. In those models, however, precaution-
ary savings and perfect information about the Markov processes of shocks rule out consumption
drops of that magnitude from the equilibrium dynamics, while in our model the learning friction
allows us to support them as short-run AU equilibria.
The RE and FVL models also produce large consumption declines when the economy switches
to ·l, but both are signi¯cantly smaller than in the BL model. In the RE model this is again
because precautionary savings and the lack of overborrowing prevented a large accumulation of
debt in the optimistic phase. In the FVL model the smaller consumption drop occurs because
there is no Fisherian de°ation of collateral values, which yields the smallest correction in debt, and
hence implies the smaller consumption drop.
Figure 8 illustrates the dynamics of key asset pricing variables. Panel (a) plots the model's
implicit endogenous interest rate premium that measures the di®erence between the stochastic
intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption (u0(ct)=¯Es
t[u0(ct+1)]) and the real
interest rate R. This is also a measure of the shadow value of the collateral constraint, because
using condition (12) the interest premium is equal to ¹t=(u0(ct) ¡ ¹t). Thus, if the constraint does
not bind, there is no interest rate premium, and when it binds the premium rises as the constraint
becomes more binding.
The dynamics of the interest premium are in line with our previous argument stating that,
when ¯nancial innovation starts, the constraint becomes nonbinding, and then it begins to bind
after some time. In particular, in the BL model the constraint begins to bind after period 5. Then
the interest premium rises monotonically, at a decreasing rate, to converge to about 5.5 percent at
the peak of the optimistic phase. In contrast, the FVL model generates a larger premium of up
to 7 percent, while the RE model generates a premium of just above 2 percent in the optimistic
35phase. This is natural because in the FVL model rising land prices do not contribute to relax the
borrowing limit, and in the RE model the constraint is less binding because individuals desire to
save more with rational expectations than with optimistic beliefs.
When the switch to the pessimistic phase takes place at date 41, there is a large jump in interest
premia as the collateral constraint becomes severely binding, in line with the large reversals in debt
and consumption. This jump in part due to the exogenous shift in ·; but in the BL and RE models
it is also heavily in°uenced by the endogenous dynamics driven by the Fisherian de°ation and,
in the BL model, the learning friction. This explains why the surge in the interest premia is the
largest in the BL model, followed by the RE model, and the FVL model last. After the crisis
at date 41, however, the constraint becomes nonbinding for 4 periods in the BL model and for 1
period in RE. Afterwards the interest premia become positive again, hovering around 7 percent in
the FVL model throughout the rest of the experiment and gradually increasing to reach 8.9 and
8.2 percent in the BL and RE models respectively.








t is the conditional standard deviation of land returns evaluated
using subjective beliefs). Es
t[R
q
t+1 ¡ R] and ¾s
t(R
q
t+1) are also plotted separately in panels (c) and
(f) respectively. The evolution of the Sharpe ratios shows that the compensation for taking risk
increases in all three models during the optimistic phase, but the increase in the BL and FVL
models is larger and more gradual than in the RE model. Moreover, plots (c) and (f) show that the




t+1) during the optimistic phase, since Es
t[R
q
t+1¡R] remains largely stable. Thus, these results
indicate that the buildup of optimism in the two models with imperfect information contributes
signi¯cantly to reduce the perceived riskiness of land and increase the over-compensation of risk-
taking, putting upward pressure on asset prices. Note, however, that even though up to period 40
the Sharpe ratios of the BL and FVL models are very similar, both the mean excess returns and
the variability of returns are higher in the BL model. In contrast, excess returns show fairly similar
behavior in the RE and BL models. These results are in line with the previous result showing that
the FVL economy yields the largest land price increase, and re°ect again the implications of the
limited price guarantee that ¯xed land valuation for collateral provides.




t ]: The dynamics
of this variable in the optimistic phase di®er sharply across the three models, and they are largely
driven by the dynamics of ¾s
t(Mt+1
t ), because we found that Es
t[Mt+1
t ] is fairly stable for t = 0;:::;40.
36Figure 8: Asset Price Dynamics
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Notes: Top left panel plots the interest rate premium that represents the di®erence between the intertemporal MRS
and the risk-free rate which can be simpli¯ed to
¹t
u0(ct)¡¹t. The premium in period 41 is 38.03, 1.99, and 0.81 in
baseline, RE, and FVL scenarios, respectively. Period 41 values for the Sharpe ratio (expected excess return) are
134.71 (13.94), 48.59 (0.73), and 5.16 (0.30) in BL, RE, and FVL scenarios, respectively.
This changes abruptly in period 41, when both ¾s
t(Mt+1
t ) and Es
t[Mt+1
t ] fall sharply, but the fall in
the former is larger, and hence the price of risk falls.
The price of risk increases initially in both RE and BL models, but after a couple of periods it
settles at about 0.22 in the RE model while in the BL model it continues to rise gradually until it
reaches about 0.5 by period 40. In contrast, in the FVL model the price of risk is lower initially and
falls slightly during the optimistic phase. Thus, the e®ects of optimism on the price of risk are the
opposite when optimism and the Fisherian de°ation channel interact than when collateral assets
are valued at a constant price. This is in line again with the intuition that the FVL embodies an
37implicit land price guarantee, which reduces the price of risk, while the price of risk rises in the BL
model.
Panel (e) shows the direct e®ect of the borrowing constraint on expected excess returns (de¯ned
in Equation (10)) expressed as a ratio of the latter.24 Looking at panels (a) and (e), we ¯nd that
the scenario where the collateral constraint binds the most and produces the largest interest rate
premia (the FVL scenario), is also the scenario in which the direct e®ect of the collateral constraint
contributes the most to the excess land returns (more than 90 percent by period 40). In the BL
model, the direct e®ect rises gradually to reach about 30 percent by period 40. In the RE model,
the contribution remains stable at about 10 percent from periods 5 to 40. The contribution of the
direct e®ect grows very large in all three models when the ¯rst switch to ·l occurs, as the credit
constraint becomes very binding, and after that it remains large in the FVL model and falls back
to zero in the other two models as debt is adjusted sharply, but then it rises again as the constraint
becomes very binding.
The relatively small contribution of the direct e®ect to mean excess returns in the optimistic
phase of the BL and RE models, coupled with the nontrivial mean excess returns (as high as





t+1) also play an important role. Moreover, in the very early stages of this phase, when





t+1) is becoming more negative. Thus, perceived riskiness of land holdings







t+1) are falling. In addition, the fact that in





t+1) implies that the undervaluation of risk is the only mechanism at work when the
model is used to produce the calibrated initial priors that matched the observed 47.5 basis points
RMBS spread at t = 1. The direct e®ect of the borrowing constraint is not at work because the
constraint is not binding at t = 1.
3.2.3 Turning Points
Table 2 lists changes in average bond-output ratios and land prices, calculated with the data of the
forecast functions, at the key turning points: the peak of optimism at t = 40 relative to the pre-
¯nancial-innovation initial conditions, and at the end of the learning experiment (t = 48) relative




















t ) is the conditional correlation between
land returns and the stochastic discount factor based on date-t beliefs.
38to the peak of optimism (which we label as ¯nancial crisis). The ¯gures shown in this table are
the di®erences in the levels of b=y and q projected by the forecast functions, but not expressed in
deviations from long-run means (as was the case in the plots of Figure 7).
Table 2: Average Changes at the Turning Points
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Data RE FVL BL
Peak of Optimism:
E[(b=y)40 ¡ (b=y)0] -0.355 -0.083 -0.089 -0.223
E[(ql=y)40 ¡ (ql=y)0] 0.280 -0.025 0.305 0.122
Financial Crisis:
E[(b=y)48 ¡ (b=y)40] 0.023 0.122 0.133 0.254
E[(ql=y)48 ¡ (ql=y)40] -0.149 0.013 -0.305 -0.121
Note: Data column reports the di®erence between 2006Q4 and 1996Q4 observations in the top panel and the
di®erence between 2008Q4 and 2006Q4 observations in the bottom panel. In columns 2-4 the realizations of · are
set to the path described in the text. Period 0 in all three scenarios corresponds to the 1996Q4 data observations,
which are the initial conditions. qL=y is the aggregate market value of residential land divided by output.
This table illustrates two main results. First, the BL model can explain a signi¯cant part of
the increases in debt and land prices before the ¯nancial crisis. Second, the BL model generates
signi¯cantly higher debt in the optimistic phase than the RE or FVL models, and a much larger
land price increase than the RE model.
The BL model can explain 63 percent of the increase in household debt observed in the data
(in the model b=y falls by almost 23 percentage points v. 36 percentage points in the data).
Moreover, the decline in bond holdings in the BL model is about 14 percentage points of GDP larger
than in the RE or FVL models. The comparison with the RE model shows again that ¯nancial
innovation, when agents are uncertain about the true nature of the new ¯nancial environment,
produces signi¯cant overborrowing. The comparison with the FVL model shows, also in line with
our previous ¯ndings, that the interaction of the learning friction with the debt-de°ation channel
has signi¯cant quantitative implications for the size of the credit boom that the model can produce.
Comparing the changes in land prices, we ¯nd that the BL model accounts for about 44 percent
of the land price boom observed in the data (the increase in q in the model reaches almost 13
percentage points at date 40, v. 28 percentage points in the data). In line with what we noted in
39the comparison of forecast functions, the RE model yields a slight fall in q, instead of an increase,
and the FVL model generates a larger price increase than the BL model.
Consider now the changes in bond holdings and land prices during the ¯nancial crisis. The BL
model generates a large debt reversal of about 25 percentage points (and this after an even larger
reversal between periods 40 and 41, as shown in Figure 7). By contrast, in the data the correction
was only 2.3 percentage points. The model clearly overestimates the reversal in debt, but part of
the discrepancy is due to the fact that bonds in the model are one-period bonds while the average
maturity of household debt is signi¯cantly higher than a quarter. Thus, agents in the model repay
and re-¯nance their debt every period, but in the data this is not the case, particularly with long-
term debt contracts such as 30-year mortgages. As a result, the switch to ·l leads to an abrupt
decline in debt in the model, while in the data this has an e®ect that is spread over time. Indeed,
as shown in the top panel of Figure 1, the reversal in the household debt ratio has continued, and
the more recent data show that it has reversed by about 10 percentage points of GDP.
The BL does a nice job at matching the observed decline in land prices during the ¯nancial
crisis (12.1 and 14.9 percentage points in model and data respectively). This is after an initial
price collapse between periods 40 and 41 that is signi¯cantly larger than what the model predicts
between periods 40 and 48. In contrast, the FVL model now produces a larger price decline, about
twice as large as in the data, and the price change in the RE model is again small and in the
opposite direction from the BL and FVL models.
3.2.4 Projected Excess Returns on Land
Next we investigate the projections of future excess land returns that underlie the discounting of
future land dividends for the computation of q at key dates in the model's dynamics. Looking
at these projections illustrates further the agents' perception of the riskiness of land during the
optimistic and pessimistic phases. Figure 9 plots the t + j-period-ahead expected excess returns
for up to 50 periods ahead of t =1, 40, and 41 (in panels (a), (b) and (c) respectively). These are
expectations that agents form looking into the future given beliefs and decision rules as of periods
1, 40 or 41. In each scenario, we set the initial state of nature so that b is at the mean bond holdings
predicted by the forecast function in Figure 7 for the corresponding date, · to its corresponding
value in the history ·t, and TFP to its mean value.
Focusing on expected excess returns projected as of date 1 in panel (a), the excess returns in the
RE model exceed slightly those of the BL setup up to the 10th period, and afterwards the ordering
40Figure 9: Excess Returns

































Notes: Expected excess returns for 50 periods ahead of initial dates t =1, 40, and 41, computed using the beliefs and
associated equilibrium pricing function of the each date's optimization problem. The expected returns are conditional
on the bond holdings predicted for each initial date by the forecast functions of Figure 7, the mean value of TFP
(z = 1), and the value of kappa indicated in the history of realizations for each date t. The one period ahead
expected excess return in period 41 (bottom panel) is 1418, 74, and 30 percent in baseline, RE, and FVL scenarios,
respectively.
reverses and the BL model projects slightly higher returns. This pattern justi¯es the result showing
that the land price at date 1 is slightly lower in the RE model (because agents in the RE model
expect relatively higher excess land returns in the ¯rst 10 periods, which carry more weight in
discounting land dividends{and recall that land dividends are simply driven by the exogenous TFP
process, which is the same in all three models). The FVL model yields expected excess returns that
lie signi¯cantly below both the RE and BL models, and this is consistent with the sharply higher
date-1 land price produced by the FVL model. The FVL model has lower excess returns because
the removal of the debt-de°ation channel weakens the direct and indirect e®ects of the collateral
constraint on excess returns shown in Equation (10).
As agents reach the peak of the optimistic phase after observing ·h for 40 periods, expected
excess returns ahead of date 40 (panel (b)) are signi¯cantly lower than they were predicted to be
as of date 1 in the two models that incorporate the learning friction (BL and FVL). As explained
41in Section 2, this is because once the constraint binds at ·h, land returns are lower in the states
with ·h than with ·l, and optimistic agents assign higher probabilities to the former than the true
probabilities. Given lower projected excess returns, these two models also produce sharply higher
land prices at date 40 than at date 1. Moreover, comparing now the projected returns paths in the
three models as of date 40 itself, projected returns in the BL model become signi¯cantly smaller
than in the RE model, and the FVL model predicts even smaller excess returns than the RE and
BL models. This is because in the FVL model beliefs turn as optimistic as in the learning model,
but the removal of the debt-de°ation mechanism reduces land risk premia.
At date 41, when the switch to ·l takes place, the ordering of projected excess returns across RE
and BL models reverses (panel (c)). Projected excess returns for period 42 are very high in all three
models, because they re°ect the strong direct e®ect of the borrowing constraint tightening sharply
as · switches. This direct e®ect includes both an exogenous e®ect, simply because of the switch to
·l, and an endogenous e®ect, because of the surge in the shadow value of the borrowing constraint
(for the excess return at t = 42 expected as of t = 41, the direct e®ect in the right-hand side of
(10) is given by (1 ¡ ·l)¹41). Moreover, this direct e®ect is the strongest in the BL model that
combines both learning and Fisherian de°ation, followed by the RE model that retains Fisherian
de°ation, and with the FVL model last. This is also in line with the size and ordering of interest
rate premia displayed in period 41 in Figure 8.
After the initial severe tightening of the borrowing constraint, and the abrupt debt adjustment
that follows, the borrowing constraint is not projected to bind in the BL and RE models for a couple
of periods, before enough debt is built up to make the constraint bind again. In the FVL model
the constraint is projected to remain binding, but still the debt adjustment reduces the tightness of
the constraint sharply and hence the projected returns. Beyond the adjustment phase of the ¯rst
10 periods, projected returns in the BL model exceed those of the other two models, and those of
the FVL model are sharply lower. This pattern of projected excess returns is consistent with the
results showing that at date 41 the value of q is the highest in the FVL model, followed by the RE
model, and with the BL model price sharply lower than the other two.
It is also interesting to note that during periods 2 to 7 ahead of date 41, the projected excess
returns of the RE model exceed those of the BL model. This re°ects the fact that the pessimistic
expectations of the BL model result in a slower build up of debt, so that the collateral constraint is
expect to start binding a period later than under RE, and then to bind with lower shadow values
(i.e. lower ¹'s) than under RE until period 10. However, since as of date 41 beliefs still favor
42overborrowing over the long run, relative to rational expectations (compare the projected long-run
debt distribution of bonds for period 41 with the ergodic RE distribution in Figure (6)), agents
project that the borrowing constraint will eventually become more binding in the BL model than
in the RE model, and hence they project that land returns will converge to a higher level.
3.2.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We now conduct a sensitivity analysis to study how changing the model's key parameters alters our
main ¯ndings. To simplify the exposition, we focus only on the turning point e®ects. We examine
¯rst in Table 3 various scenarios changing the initial priors, because, as we argued earlier, the initial
priors play a central role in the model. Then we study in Table 4 changes in the values of ·h, ·l, ¯
and R . The second column of both tables shows the results for the BL model for comparison. Note
that, in general, the parameterizations that generate larger booms during the optimistic phase also
generate larger busts in the ¯nancial crisis.
Scenario (1) in Table 3 shows the results obtained by setting uniformly-distributed initial priors
(n0 = 1). In this scenario, debt dynamics are qualitatively the same as in the BL model but the
debt buildup is smaller (9 percentage points v. 22 in BL). Moreover, the price of land falls to a
level about 2 percentage points lower in period 40 than in period 1, which is sharply at odds with
the nearly 12 percentage points increase produced in the BL model. The reason for this is that,
throughout the optimistic phase, the beliefs about the persistence of ·h with the uniform priors are
always lower than in the BL model. As explained before, the initial means of the two distributions
Table 3: Sensitivity on Priors
(1) (2) (3) (4)






E[(b=y)40 ¡ (b=y)0] -0.223 -0.087 -0.243 -0.222 -0.221
E[(ql=y)40 ¡ (ql=y)0] 0.122 -0.020 0.142 0.121 0.121
E[(b=y)48 ¡ (b=y)40] 0.254 0.137 0.274 0.253 0.254
E[(ql=y)48 ¡ (ql=y)40] -0.121 -0.006 -0.141 -0.120 -0.123
Note: The ¯rst column reproduces the baseline scenario results. The exercise conducted is the same as that explained
in the note for Table 2 with di®erent parameter values as indicated in column headings.
43of priors are the same (0.5), but with the BL priors agents turn optimistic faster after starting to
observe ·hs and reach a higher level of optimism.
Examining the forecast functions of land prices we found that prices with uniform priors follow a
u-shaped trajectory in the optimistic phase, instead of the monotonically increasing path displayed
in the BL case.The reason for this is the more gradual buildup of optimism with the uniform priors,
which a®ects the relative magnitude of the e®ects of higher mean and higher variance of · on land
prices after ¯nancial innovation. In the early years, the e®ect of higher variance dominates that of
higher mean, causing a decline in the price of land, until agents have turned optimistic enough. As
agents observe more ·hs, and su±cient optimism builds up, the higher mean dominates the higher
variance, but under uniform priors this requires a longer sequence of ·h than in the baseline case.
Thus, if we look at an optimistic phase of more than 40 periods with the uniform priors, we again
¯nd that at the peak of the optimistic phase the price of land is higher than in period 1.
The ¯nancial crisis e®ects on land prices and debt are also much weaker under the uniform
priors than in the BL scenario, again because of the more gradual adjustment of beliefs (now in the
switch to pessimistic beliefs and the buildup of pessimism). Debt adjusts by 14 percentage points
instead of 25, and the price of land falls only by 0.6 of a percentage point, instead of nearly 12
percentage points.
Reducing the initial priors to n0 = 0:01 in Scenario (2) moves the model further away from
uniform priors than in the BL case (which was calibrated to n0 = 0:0205), with even more of the
mass of the initial distributions of beliefs concentrated around 0 and 1. Consequently, when agents
observe the ¯rst ·h they turn more optimistic than in the BL case, and hence they borrow more
and demand more of the risky asset. This produces larger debt and land price booms. The size
of the debt buildup is about 24 percentage points and the boom in the price of land reaches 14
percentage points. Similar e®ects are at work, but in the opposite direction, in the pessimistic
phase, and hence with n0 = 0:01 we ¯nd a larger correction in debt and a larger drop in land prices
in the ¯nancial crisis.
In Scenario (3) we increase nhh
0 and nll
0 so that Es
0[F] = Ea





0 at the BL calibration values of 0:0205 (i.e. in this case the continuation
counters and the switching counters di®er). The aim here is to start agents o® with distributions
of priors that have means that happen to be equal to the true persistence parameters of the ·
regimes. Since agents have no way of knowing that this is the case, however, they still update their
beliefs as they observe subsequent realizations of ·. This scenario yields results very similar to
44the BL model. This is because with nhh
0 = nll
0 = 0:54 and nhl
0 = nhl
0 = 0:0:0205 agents still face
signi¯cant uncertainty about the true regime-switching structure of the credit regimes, and hence
they still turn quite optimistic. In fact, their initial beliefs about Es[Fhh] are more optimistic in
Scenario (3) than in the BL case (in the latter they start with Es
0[Fhh] = 0:5 v. Es
0[Fhh] = 0:964
in Scenario (3)). This does not, however, translate into signi¯cantly more borrowing because these
di®erences in initial optimism become small after a few periods, since the BL model also generates
a substantial amount of optimism relatively quickly.
Next we investigate a scenario that assumes that the ·l realizations observed during the pre-
innovation period are \informative" (Scenario (4)). This runs contrary to our assumption that a
true structural ¯nancial innovation took place in the beginning of 1997, so that any information
about the ¯nancial environment prior to that date became useless. Since the BL calibration sets ·l
at the value of the pre-¯nancial-innovation era, However, one could argue that ·l had been observed
for a while before ¯nancial innovation, and thus agents could have learned about its persistence.
Accordingly, Scenario (4) sets the initial priors such that agents take into account the realizations
of ·l during 1980-1996 (nll
0 =68 observations) and 1 transition from ·l to ·h right at the beginning
of innovation (nhh
0 =1): This scenario is also akin to a formulation in which we could bias the initial
priors so as to make agents perceive a much higher probability of continuation of a low-leverage
regime.
The priors in Scenario (4) imply Es
0[Fll] = 0:985 v. Es
0[Fll] = 0:5 in the BL model. With the
modi¯ed priors, agents believe that when or if the economy transits into the ·l regime, it will stay
there for some time. As a result, during the earlier periods of the optimistic phase the conjectured
ergodic distributions of bonds are double-peaked with a large mass around the mean conditional
on ·l . This implies that unconditional mean debt is smaller than in the BL model during the
optimistic phase. Conversely, we ¯nd higher debt levels during the pessimistic phase in Scenario
(4) because, having observed one transition from ·l to ·h, the agents turn less pessimistic compared
to the BL case. Despite these di®erences in conjectured long-run distributions, the turning-points
dynamics reported in Table 3 do not di®er much across Scenario (4) and the BL case. This is
because, despite the di®erences in unconditional means, the means conditional on · do not di®er
much, and this occurs because the forecast functions used for the turning points use the history ·T
described earlier and we also kept nhl
0 and nhl
0 unchanged. Thus the evolution of Es
t[Fhh] is also
the same and this results in similar dynamics for the ¯rst 40 periods in which ·h is observed.
45Summing up, the sensitivity analysis covered in Table 3 illustrates the importance of the initial
priors. In particular, what is crucial for the size of the booms and busts in debt and land prices is
that the new ¯nancial regime is truly a structural change, in terms of agents having very limited
knowledge about the transition and continuation probabilities of ·h. To be precise, for the model
to generate sizable booms and busts, agents having never observed ·h beign ignorant about the
likelihood of transitions from ·h to ·l is crucial. This is evident in the fact that the results for
Scenario (1) with uniform priors are far less favorable than the BL model and the other three
scenarios. In this scenario, agents have \stronger" priors about the persistence of ·h, because n0=1
implies that they have observed one transition from ·h to ·l and also one from ·h to ·h. Hence,
they can rule out the possibility of ·h being close to absorbent. In addition, Scenario (4) shows that
we can allow the priors about ·l to re°ect a high number of observed realizations of that regime,
but as long as nhh and nhl are low, the magnitude of the boom and crash in debt and land prices
remain about the same as in the BL case. The same applies to scenarios (1) and (2), because both
of these use initial counters that are distant from 1.
The above results also highlight the importance of our criterion to calibrate the initial priors
in the BL exercise to match the observed excess return in the 1997:Q1 RMBS. Clearly the initial
counters can be set arbitrarily low enough to generate large e®ects or high enough to minimize the
e®ects of optimistic and pessimistic expectations, so having a data-based criterion to discipline the
values of the initial counters is very useful in helping us assess the potential relevance of the model.
We now turn to Table 4 which reports the turning-point e®ects in scenarios that change R;
·h, ·l, and ¯. Scenario (1) considers a lower value of R, and is motivated by the observation
that interest rates declined at around the same time as the beginning of ¯nancial innovation, and
remained very low since then. Hence, one may argue that, because of U.S. ¯nancial innovation, or
because of other forces like the large purchases of U.S. T-bills from China, the real interest rate fell
along with the increase in the U.S. agents' ability to borrow.25 Accordingly, we changed R to the
average interest rate for the period 1997-2008 in the data, which is 0.98 percent (as opposed to the
1980-1996 average of 2.66 percent used in the BL case).
With the lower R, the new long-run means of debt and land price are considerably larger, E[b=y]
goes down from -0.36 in the RE and BL to -0.41, and the land price increases from 0.45 to 0.53.
25This experiment is also motivated by the fact that in the model R is exogenous. Clearly if we maintained the
same setting of the BL model and endogenized R, the boom in debt would be weakened by an endogenous increase
in R. But in the data the opposite was observed, so we opted for an alternative in which we keep R exogenous but
allow it to change to approximate its observed decline.
46Table 4: Sensitivity on Other Parameters
(1) (2) (3) (4)
BL R=1:0098 ·l=0:75 ·h=0:8 ¯=0:95
E[(b=y)40 ¡ (b=y)0] -0.223 -0.248 -0.240 -0.143 -0.237
E[(ql=y)40 ¡ (ql=y)0] 0.122 0.158 0.140 0.120 0.140
E[(b=y)48 ¡ (b=y)40] 0.254 0.208 0.157 0.175 0.175
E[(ql=y)48 ¡ (ql=y)40] -0.121 -0.038 -0.059 -0.120 0.098
Note: The ¯rst column reproduces the baseline scenario results. The exercise conducted is the same as that explained
in the note for Table 2 with di®erent parameter values as indicated in column headings.
Intuitively, since R falls, the asset price needs to go up in equilibrium in order for the expected
returns of these two to be equated. In addition to these changes in long-run averages, Scenario (1)
in Table 4 shows that lower R generates larger increases in debt and asset prices than the BL case
during the optimistic phase. Lower interest rates support higher asset prices which in turn relax
the borrowing constraint allowing the agents to borrow more.26 Note, however, that in the crisis
the correction in debt is about 5 percentage points smaller, and the decline in the price of land is
signi¯cantly smaller. Thus, considering falling real interest rates that coincide with the arrival of
¯nancial innovation enlarges the size of the debt and land price booms predicted by the model, but
it makes the reversal of both smaller.
Increasing ·l in Scenario (2) increases the size of booms in debt and land prices slightly. Note
that the change only applies to the value of ·l in the new ¯nancial regime, while the pre-innovation
value of · remains unchanged at its baseline value of 0.642. The larger debt and price booms occur,
even though we still have the same sequence of 40 realizations of ·h as in the BL case, because
agents take into account the fact that with the higher ·l the low-leverage regime is not as low as
in the BL case. This results in both a higher mean and a lower variance of ·, which support both
larger debt and higher land prices. The size of the reversals in debt and land prices are smaller
because ·l is higher than in the baseline, and thus allows agents to borrow more than in the BL
26In calculating turning points we measure the size of the boom relative to the 1996Q4 values in the data. If we
were to measure the size of the boom as deviations from long run means, the boom during the optimistic phase would
be smaller in this scenario compared to the BL case, because the long-run means of debt and land price are higher,
as explained in the previous paragraph.
47case, and the resulting direct and indirect e®ects of the collateral constraint on asset prices are
weaker.
Reducing ·h to 0.8 (Scenario (3)) reduces the size of the debt buildup, because of the tighter
credit constraint in the high-leverage regime in this experiment, and reduces also the size of the
debt reversal in the crisis, because debt falls from a lower level at the peak of the boom. The land
price boom and crash change only marginally.
Finally, Scenario (4) shows results for a higher value of ¯ (0.95 v. 0.91 in the BL case). The
higher discount factor supports higher asset prices, because agents discount the future less. Since
the collateral constraint becomes binding early in the optimistic phase, these higher asset prices
translate into higher debt levels.27 Hence, this scenario delivers slightly larger debt and land price
booms than in the BL case during the optimistic phase. In contrast, the ¯nancial crisis e®ects with
higher ¯ are weaker than in the BL model, particularly in the case of asset prices (which recover
quickly after a decline in period 41 and reach levels higher than pre-crisis by period 48).
4 Conclusion
The U.S. ¯nancial crisis was preceded by a decade of fast growth in household debt, residential land
prices, and leverage, accompanied by far-reaching ¯nancial innovation with the introduction of new
instruments and deep changes in the regulatory framework. In this paper, we argued that ¯nancial
innovation in an environment with imperfect information and credit frictions was a central factor
behind the credit and land price booms that led to the crisis, and in the transmission mechanism
that drove the crisis itself. To make these points, we examined the interaction between ¯nancial
innovation, learning, and a Fisherian collateral constraint in a stochastic equilibrium model of
household debt and land prices.
We used the model to study the quantitative implications of an experiment calibrated to U.S.
data in which ¯nancial innovation begins with a switch to a high-leverage regime, but agents do
not know the true regime-switching probabilities across high- and low-leverage regimes. Agents
are Bayesian learners, however, so in the long-run, after observing a long history of realizations
of leverage regimes, they learn the true regime-switching transition probabilities. The collateral
constraint introduces Fisher's classic debt-de°ation ampli¯cation mechanism, providing a vehicle
for the waves of optimism and pessimism produced by Bayesian learning to have ampli¯cation
27By contrast, in the long run, as the model converges to RE and the constraint does not bind, the higher ¯ brings
¯R closer to 1, which strengthens precautionary savings incentives and reduces debt.
48e®ects on debt and land prices. In this regard, this papers o®ers a novel analysis in which the
Fisherian feedback loop between debt and asset prices interacts with the formation of beliefs, both
of which we are at the core of Fisher's original arguments on the debt-de°ation theory.
In our setup, a buildup of optimism is a natural consequence of ¯nancial innovation, because
agents start without enough data to correctly evaluate the riskiness of the new environment. Cal-
ibrating the leverage regimes to data on the ratio of household debt to residential land values,
and the initial priors to the excess returns on the 30-year Fannie Mae RMBS in early 1997, the
model predicts that agents would turn very optimistic very quickly between the mid-1990s and the
mid-2000s, after observing only a few quarters of the high-leverage regime.
The debt-de°ation channel plays an important role because, as optimism builds up and land
prices rise, the agents' ability to borrow also grows. Similarly, when optimism turns to pessimism,
after the ¯rst observation of the low-leverage regime, which we dated at the beginning of 2007, after
the start of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the Fall of 2006, the debt-de°ation channel ampli¯es
the reversals in debt and asset prices. This occurs because ¯re-sales of land drive down land prices
and reduce the agents' ability to borrow.
The interaction of the learning friction and the debt-de°ation mechanism generates substantial
overborrowing, which accounts for almost two-thirds of the increase in net debt of U.S. households,
and about two-¯fths of the boom in residential land prices, observed between 1997 and 2006.
Moreover, the model also predicts a credit crunch, a crash in land values, a collapse in consumption
and a surge in private savings after the ¯rst realization of the low-leverage regime. In contrast, the
size of the debt and price booms, and the subsequent collapses, are signi¯cantly smaller in variants
of the model that remove the learning friction or the debt-de°ation mechanism.
Our work has important implications for the ongoing debate on ¯nancial reforms to prevent
future crises. First, since by de¯nition the true riskiness of a truly brand-new ¯nancial regime
cannot be correctly evaluated when the new regime starts, and little or no data is available on its
performance, exposure to the credit boom-bust process we studied in this paper comes along with
the potential bene¯ts of ¯nancial innovation. Hence, close supervision of ¯nancial intermediaries
in the early stages of ¯nancial innovation is critical.
Second, the interaction of information frictions and collateral constraints can strengthen the
case for macro-prudential policies. Using the model developed in this paper, Bianchi et al. (2012)
conduct normative analysis and ¯nd that macro-prudential policies have potential to contain boom-
bust cycles if regulators have access to better information than the private agents. Conversely,
49assuming that policymakers are as uninformed as households about how ¯nancial markets will
perform after radical structural changes, taxes on debt can address overborrowing due to the credit
externality, but not due to optimistic beliefs.
Third, the ongoing ¯nancial reform process (e.g. Basle III, the Dodd-Frank act) is a new
round of radical innovation in capital markets, now tightening the legal and regulatory framework,
which will a®ect the types of securities that will be available and the size of the markets in which
they will trade. Hence, agents once again will have to evaluate the riskiness of the new ¯nancial
environment with beliefs based on imperfect information. As a result, the risk exists that a few
years of slow credit growth and poor performance in asset markets can lead to the buildup of
pessimistic expectations that will hamper the recovery of ¯nancial markets.
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53Appendix A Solution Method
We solve each AUOP using an Euler equation method that combines price and policy function
iterations using the land pricing equation and the general equilibrium conditions (12)-(15). By
proceeding in this way, instead of solving the agents' Bellman equation, we avoid using aggregate
states and iterations to converge on the representative agent condition matching individual and
aggregate laws of motion for bond holdings.
The full algorithm for solving the recursive AU equilibrium proceeds in these steps:
1. De¯ne a history of realizations ·T and calculate the sequence of posteriors ff(Fs j ·t)gT
t=1.













1[·0j·] and a guess for the land pricing function q1(bt;zt;·t); solve for the date-1
equilibrium conditions using a policy function iteration algorithm.
4. Use the resulting policy functions [b0
1(b;z;·);c1(b;z;·);¹1(b;z;·)] from Step 3 and the asset
pricing equation (11) to compute a new pricing function ^ q1(bt;zt;·t).
5. Compare ^ q1(bt;zt;·t) and q1(bt;zt;·t), if they satisfy a convergence criterion then the decision
rules [b0
1(b;z;·);c1(b;z;·);¹1(b;z;·)] and the pricing function q1(bt;zt;·t) are the solutions
of the date-1 AUOP. If not, construct a new guess of the pricing function using a Gauss-Siedel
rule and return to Step 3.
6. Move to the date-2 with history ·2 and posterior f(Fs j ·2) from Step 1. Compute the
Markov transition matrix Es
2[·0j·], and return to Step 3 in order to solve for the date-2
AUOP. Repeat for each date-t history ·t and posterior f(Fs j ·t) for t = 1;:::T solving each
time for the corresponding date-t AUOP.
The passive Bayesian learning has important implications that can be useful in implementing
the above algorithm:
1. The solutions to each date-t AUOP are not functionally related (i.e., solving a particular date-
t problem does not require knowing anything about the solution for any other date). Thus,
the model can be solved by solving each date-t AUOP independently.28 Still, we can speed
28This fact can be used to develop a strategy to speed up the full solution of the model, because in a computer
with n number of cores, we can solve n AUOPs for n di®erent dates simultaneously.
54convergence if, whenever jjf(Fs j ·t+j) ¡ f(Fs j ·t)jj is small enough under some metric, we
use for the date t + j AUOP initial guesses given by the date-t AUOP.
2. If j · T is large enough for f(Fs j ·t+j) to converge to Fa (for some convergence criterion),
the solutions for all dates t ¸ j collapse to a standard recursive RE equilibrium using the
true Markov process Fa.
3. Since the full equilibrium solution of the intertemporal sequence of allocations and prices
from dates 1 to T is obtained by chaining the solutions of each date-t AUOP (for t = 1;::T),






supporting a di®erent sequence of posterior densities f(Fs j ·t
i)T
t=1. We consider only one
history ·T because we take the stance that the ¯nancial innovation experiment we look at
in the data can be represented by a particular history ·T, intended to match the observed






i=1, which could be done using the true Markov process Fa, solve
the model for each, and then take averages across these di®erent solutions at each date t.
Appendix B Computation of Ergodic Distributions, Forecast Func-
tions, Excess Returns
B.1 Ergodic Distribution and Forecast Functions under Rational Expectations
De¯ne the date t probability distribution over bonds, productivity and collateral coe±cients in the









¸t(b;z;·)¼(z0 j z)p(·0 j ·)
where g(b;z;·) is the policy function that sets the optimal decision rule for bonds, ¼(z0 j z) is the
Markov transition probability for productivity shocks, and p(·0 j ·) is the true Markov transition
probability of · (with the two Markov processes assumed to be independent). The unconditional
limiting distribution of bonds, productivity and collateral coe±cients is given by ¸(b;z;·), and
it represents the ¯xed point of the above law of motion. The algorithm computes the ergodic
distribution exactly in this way, by performing iterations of the law of motion until ¸t(b;z;·) and
¸t+1(b0;z0;·0) satisfy a convergence criterion.
55Forecast functions are averages of the model's endogenous variables computed at each date t
using the corresponding distribution ¸t(b;z;·); starting from any initial condition (b0;z0;·0) with
distribution ¸0(b0;z0;·0) = 1. By construction, just like iterations on the above law of motion
of probabilities converge to the long-run distribution, forecast functions converge to unconditional
long-run averages computed with the ergodic distribution, regardless of the initial conditions (as
long as the ergodic distribution itself is unique and invariant).
Given ¸t(b;z;·); the date-t conditional probability distribution over ·i for i = h;l is de¯ned as
follows:






Conditional forecast functions are averages for the models endogenous variables computed at
each date t using the corresponding distribution ~ ¸t(b;z j ·i). By construction, as ¸t(b;z;·i) !
¸(b;z;·), the date-t conditional distribution ~ ¸t(b;z j ·i) converges to the corresponding long-run
conditional distribution ~ ¸(b;z j ·i): Moreover, conditional forecast functions of any endogenous
variable converge to the corresponding conditional long-run average.
B.2 AU Forecast Functions in the Learning Model
The learning model has dynamics in the beliefs about the transition probability matrix of ·, and
hence the RE de¯nitions of conditional and unconditional forecast functions do not apply. Intu-
itively, one can construct a set of forecast functions and ergodic distributions by using the corre-
sponding date¡t beliefs to form all the expectations about future states. In light of this, we de¯ne
forecast functions in the AU learning model by averaging only over productivity shocks and tracking
the decision rules produced at each date by the corresponding set of beliefs and the corresponding
date's AU optimization problem. Speci¯cally, we compute forecast functions in the learning model
as follows: Take as given (b0;z0;·0), then the relevant values of the forecast function of bonds in a
56learning period of length T with a sequence of realizations [·t]
T
t=0are:
^ b1 = E
£
b1 j (b0;z0;·0);f(Fs j ·0)
¤
= h0(b0;z0;·0;f(Fs j ·0))
^ b2 = E
£











^ b3 = E
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^ bT+1 = E
£











where ¼(zt j z0) = ¼(zt j zt¡1)¼(zt¡1 j zt¡2):::¼(z1 j z0) is the probability of a particular history









is the optimal decision rule for bonds determined by the date-t AUOP
using the date-t beliefs and evaluated for the states (bt;zt;·t). Note that because of the recursive
structure of the ^ b0
ts, the expectations that form these forecast functions are conditional not just on
date-0 states (i.e., (b0;z0;·0);), but on the history of realizations [·t]
T





The equivalent objects to compare with in the rational expectations model are:
~ b1 = E [b1 j (b0;z0;·0)] = g(b0;z0;·0)





¼(z1 j z0)g (b1;z1;·1)





¼(z2 j z0)g (b2;z2;·2)
::::::





¼(zT j z0)g (bT;zT;·T)
We can also express the forecast functions of the learning model with a slight modi¯cation of
the treatment used under rational expectations. De¯ne the probability distribution of TFP shocks
and bond holdings at date t in the learning model as Ât(b;z): The law of motion for the evolution













At date-0, for example, we have Â0(b0;z0) = 1 for the particular initial conditions (b0;z0); and











We could add the indicators for all other possible initial conditions, but since they satisfy Â0(b;z) =










Now we can compute the expected bonds chosen at date 1 for beginning of period 2 as:
^ b2 = E
£










. At this point we can add
over all values of bonds in the state space because the probabilities already have incorporated the
information relevant for the \correct" bond positions that the system can land on in period 2 in
the learning model.







In writing it this way, we take out the indicator function but keep track of only the relevant initial
states that can land in each b0 by constraining the set of b0s over which the summation is taken.
B.3 Expected Returns j Periods Ahead of Date t
Choose an initial triple (bt;zt;·t) with initial bond holdings set to bt = ^ bt. t is the period for which
we are going to calculate the sequence of expected returns j periods ahead. ^ bt stands for the mean
bond holdings at period t obtained from the forecast functions. zt is set equal to 1. ·t is set to
its value used in the forecast function calculations for the corresponding period t. We calculate
expected returns for any date t + 1 + j as of date t . This calculation involves a numerator with
the sum of dividends and price of date t + 1 + j, [qt(bt+j+1;zt+j+1;·t+j+1) + d(zt+j+1)], and a
denominator with the price as of date t+j, qt(bt+j;zt+j;·t+j), all of which are projected as of the
initial date t .
58We proceed in two steps. First, we calculate the probability tree of possible states in which the
economy can land conditional on the initial triple (bt;zt;·t) up to J periods ahead. The events
that we are capturing in this probability tree are the combinations of TFP and · shocks. Second,
we construct the Es
t[R
q
t+1+j] sequence for j = 0;1;:::;J. Finally, as a cross check we recover the










recalculate the date-t price as the present discounted value of dividends discounted by expected
returns.
In the ¯rst step to calculate the probability tree we put all the mass on the initial state that
we are conditioning our calculations on for j = 0. In other words,
¸t
t(bt;zt;·t) = 1:















for j = 0;1;:::;J. Ht+j+1 is the set of bond holdings chosen conditional on a triple (bt+j;zt+j;·t+j),
which is de¯ned as Ht+j+1 = fbt+j+1 : bt+j+1 = ht
¡




t+j+1 highlights the fact that this is the date-t+j element for the law of motion that started
with initial conditions ¸t
t(bt;zt;·t) as of date t, so that the probabilities are conditional on date t.
In the second step, to compute the expected returns, we ¯rst take the date t+j element of the
sequence of ¸0s, ¸t
t+j(bt+j;zt+j;·t+j). Intuitively, this is the equilibrium probability of landing in
a particular state (bt+j;zt+j;·t+j) in period t + j, j periods ahead of the initial period. We then






















where d(z) = zg0(l). Note that Es
t[R
q
t+1+j] is in fact Es
t[R
q
t+1+j](bt+j;zt+j;·t+j). In other words,
the one period ahead expected returns depend on the date-j triple (bt+j;zt+j;·t+j).
To con¯rm that the calculations in the ¯rst two steps are correct, in the third step we recalculate
qt(bt;zt;·t) as the sum of expected present discounted value of future dividends where discounting





























To discount date-t+j+1 dividend, we divide it by the sum of all one-period-ahead expected returns
up to that date. The calculation of expectations in this step utilizes the probability tree computed
in the ¯rst step.
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